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1
“The islands situated between Sind and Oman in the Persian Sea
belong to Persia, the largest of which are Qis and Bahrain.”1
– Hamdallah Mustawfi
Geographer
1329

Introduction
The abandonment of the Iranian claim to Bahrain is seemingly a benign moment in
Iranian history, and those analyzing modern Iran tend to focus on pivotal moments such as the
early parliamentary revolution (1905), the Shah’s White Revolution (1963), the Islamic
Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), or the current dialogue surrounding Iran’s
nuclear capabilities. Contemporary scholars of Iran more often than not attempt to construct
accurate accounts of these historical developments. As a result, smaller moments are often
overlooked to illustrate broader developments affecting Iran, and the greater Middle East.
Employing a lens that focuses on one event allows for detailed insight into the intricacies that
may be missed in an analysis with a wider scope. Through examining the deliberations over the
fate of the Iranian state’s claim to Bahrain between 1968 and 1970 and subsequent territorial
disputes one gains a comprehensive understanding of monarchial concerns, constraints, and
transforming regional dynamics.
The belief that Bahrain is part of Persia is an outlook expressed in centuries predating the
the reign of the last Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (r. 1941 - 1979).2 During his rule the

1

Hooshang Amirahmadi, Small Islands, Big Politics: The Tonbs and Abu Musa in the Persian Gulf (New York: St.
Martin’s, 1996), 36.
2

In 1935 Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925 - 1941) declared that Persia should be referred to in diplomatic correspondence
with foreign states as Iran. To reflect this, the name Persia will be used prior to 1935, and Iran following.
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Shah would seemingly quite willingly dispose of all formal links between the two territories.
How was he able to achieve such an outcome? Before investigating the process that brought
about this result and ensuing changes in sovereignty in the Persian Gulf it is necessary to have a
comprehensive understanding of the dual Iranian and British assertion of jurisdiction in Bahrain.
Prior to the latter’s disengagement from the region and negotiations which garnered the cessation
of the Iranian claim, both states viewed themselves as having legal right to the territory.

Pre-1968 Bahrain: Persia Proper
The Iranian claim that Bahrain is part of Persia proper cites early scholarly and artistic
work as proof of authority. The Persian geographer and poet Hamdallah Mustawfi is but one
example for in the early 14th century he was conveying an attitude of Iranian possession
mirrored centuries later by diplomats under the Shah. In his work Nezhat al-Qulub Mustawfi put
forth a vision of Iran beyond today’s borders where “the islands situated between Sind and Oman
and in the Persian Sea belong to Persia . . . the largest of which are Qis and Bahrain.”3 Mustawfi
refers to Bahrain as an entity possessed by Persia, communicating the sense of a shared identity
before the era of nationalism. What is also notable is how in this excerpt from Nezhat al-Qulub
Bahrain is explicitly singled out. Although Mustawfi is using Bahrain to communicate size, one
cannot ignore that fact that in the year 1307 Bahrain was not simply an island but an active
component of the Persian Empire. Texts from as early as the tenth century, whilst not referring to
the island of Bahrain by name, identify the same land as characteristically Persian.4 Additional
texts like these serve as further evidence of a Persian identity beyond Persia which the Iranian
3 Amirahmadi,
4
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3
government cited in its 20th century arguments of why Bahrain was neither independent nor a
British territory.
The argument for Bahrain as part of Persia is best illustrated by examining the joint
arguments put forth before the League of Nations by both London and Tehran between 1928 and
1929. During this time political representatives of both countries aired their grievances on the
international stage. Diplomatic personnel in Tehran viewed the recently concluded Treaty of
Jeddah between the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Hedjaz and Nejd as a direct violation
of Iran’s claim to Bahrain.5 In response Fatoullah Khan Pakrevan, the Acting Minister for
Foreign Affairs of Iran, crafted a document to be sent to both the Secretary-General of the
League and to the British government regarding the history, justification, and legality of Persian
jurisdiction over Bahrain.
It is in this letter that the tenets of Iran’s case for why Bahrain is formally part of Persia
proper is deconstructed. The letter was written by Iran’s foremost diplomat at the time and
provides the most insight into what members of the Iranian government were thinking. The three
facets on which the historically-rooted claim rests is articulated, beginning with the notion of
uninterrupted occupation. Pakrevan wrote that with the exception of 1507 to 1622 — the time of
Portuguese invasion — Bahrain has always been an integral part of Persia.6 Furthermore, it is
asserted that international law dictates that a sovereign state is only detached when the lawful

5

On May 20, 1927 the Treaty of Jeddah was signed between Great Britain and the Kingdom of the Hedjaz and Nejd.
Hedjaz is located on the western coast of Saudi Arabia on the Red Sea, but it was not until 1932 this territory was
referred to as Saudi Arabia. For further information on the Kingdom see J.H.W. Verzjil, International Law in
Historical Perspective (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1973), 470. For reference to the protest of the Persian
Government against this treaty see Fatoullah Khan Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6
of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," League of Nations – Official
Journal, (1928): 1358-1362.
6

Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
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owner of the territory officially recognizes its independence. In this case the state was Persia, and
since the government had yet to acknowledge Bahraini independence it was still formally part of
Iran.7. Lastly, the letter highlights that Persia’s claim rests on the existence of formal documents
that show past rulers of Bahrain expressing their submission to Persian authorities and a history
of paying taxes — thus establishing a fiscal relationship between the state and its people.8
According to Iran at this time, “no independent State known as Bahrein has ever existed.”9
Bahrain is but part of Persia, and ought to be viewed as such in the international community.
The address also acts as a rebuttal against arguments Persian officials believed the British
government might try to make. For instance, Pakrevan confronts the issue of language
differentiation for whilst in Persia Farsi was the language of the people in Bahrain it remains
Arabic. The minister snidely cited the vast size of the British Empire, which spanned across
continents speaking different languages thus legitimizing the rule of a Farsi-speaking
government over Arabic-speaking peoples. For the same reason, Iran argued that any attempt to
invalidate their claim on the basis of geography must be ignored. Neither river, sea, nor ocean
can serve to annul a claim, for the British empire had at the time 10,317 miles between London
and Nukuʻalofa, the capital of the British protectorate of Tonga. Thus, Pakrevan asserted
7

The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote that this was an “international juridical principal” and that “a
territory belonging to a sovereign State cannot be lawfully detached so long as the right of ownership has not been
transferred by this State to another State as of an official act, in this case by a treaty, or so long as its annexation by
another State or its independence have not been recognised by the lawful owner of the territory.” This logic would
suggest that since Persia has never “transferred” the “right of ownership” to another party, there is no possibility of
Bahrain being “detached” from Iran. See: Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the
Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
8

Ibid. See comments made in the letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations by the Acting Minister in
which he states that there is in existence “authentic documents . . . in which their [Bahrain] entire submission and
loyalty to the central Government”26 is proven. The “tribal chieftains” of Bahrain, Pakrevan asserts, had historical
paid taxes to Persia. it is also expressed that whilst some Bahrainis hold a rank as a “hereditary governor,” they are
continuously subject to the central government of Persia.
9
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“geographical and racial considerations can . . . be put forward only in the case of a state desiring
to justify its claim to annex a new territory.”10 Bahrain was perceived by the Persian government
not as a new claim, but one that had existed for centuries.

Pre-1968 Bahrain: A British Protectorate
The letter to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations drew great criticism from the
British Foreign Office11 where Bahrain was viewed as a protectorate of the United Kingdom. The
state initially became commercially involved in the Persian Gulf in 1723 when the British East
India Company established their first trading factory in Basra, Ottoman Iraq.12 Located on the
Shatt al-Arab river between southernmost Iraq, Kuwait, and Iran, the factory was in a prime
location for the expansion efforts of the British Empire.13 India was the jewel of Britain’s
colonial crown, and Britain’s ability to harness and export India’s resources was therefore
dependent on the security of maritime trade routes between the Indian Ocean and Western
Europe. Out of fear of such security becoming compromised, London pursued politically-binding
agreements with rulers of the small Gulf sheikhdoms which would decades later form the United
Arab Emirates — otherwise known at the time as the trucial states.

10

Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1361.
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Henceforth referred to as the Foreign Office.
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Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2008), 14.
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See the letter written by Elizabeth I on January 23 1601 in George Birdwood, The Register of Letters, &c., of the
Governour and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies, 1600-1619 (London: B. Quaritch,
1893), 3.
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On March 19, 1891 Queen Victoria signed a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation with the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman.14 This was the first of many bi-lateral,
politically binding agreements multiple sheikhdoms of the Gulf would sign with the United
Kingdom over the course of the next decade. The agreement stipulated that the Sultan would not
cede territory to any foreign power with the explicit exception of the United Kingdom. Secondly,
the Sultan would not formulate new relationships with foreign governments and such
proceedings would only be possible with London’s approval. In exchange the Sultan would
receive protection from any and all external aggression.15 This treaty became a blueprint for
subsequent covenants with other powers in the region. By the turn of the 20th century Yemen,
Sudan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the trucial states had become either formal or informal
protectorates of the United Kingdom.
Thus, when the British Foreign Secretary Austen Chamberlain received a copy of the
Persian Foreign Minister’s address regarding Bahrain he quickly drafted a response to the
“unsupported declarations that Bahrein forms an integral part of Persia.”16 Secretary
Chamberlain devoted four entire pages to contesting Iran’s contentions, asserting that the claim
of uninterrupted occupation was false due to the fact that the troops of the sixth Shah of the Zand
dynasty were driven from Bahrain by the Utubi Arabs never to fully reassert their control.17
Furthermore, he scoffed at Iran’s interpretation of “international law.” Their back and forth in

14

The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was a state that encompassed both present-day Oman and parts of the United
Arab Emirates. Muscat is the current capital of the nation of Oman, but in the 19th century this was the name of the
territory.
15

Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf Region, 15.

16 Austen

Chamberlain, "The British Government to the Secretary-General of the League," League of Nations –
Official Journal, (1929): 790-794.
17Chamberlain,

"The British Government to the Secretary-General of the League," 791.
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front of the League of Nations between 1928 and 1929 brought the issue of the sovereignty of
Bahrain to the national stage but no resolution was reached.
The dual British and Iranian claims to Bahrain were able to operate in tandem due to the
nature of their contended sovereignty. Officials in neither London nor Tehran made decisions that
directly influenced the population of Bahrain. In Tehran, Bahrain was viewed as Persia proper
but a lenient policy of autonomous rule was consistently employed to keep peace and stability.18
Since the second half of the eighteenth century the al-Khalifah family has reigned over Bahrain
with the oldest son succeeding his father as monarch. 19 In the mid-twentieth century the dual
legal claim, however, would resurface when controversial governmental measures were
introduced, as was the case in 1951 when laws were passed to extend the Iranian oil
nationalization project to the Bahrain Petroleum Company.20 Similarly, in 1957 when the Iranian
Government declared Bahrain Iran’s 14th province, London received the news with outcry.21 The
dispute over rightful sovereignty did not strain the Anglo-Iranian relationship in its entirety. The
importance of other issues continued to overshadow arguments over rightful legal jurisdiction
and the dispute seemingly came to a standstill. This all changed in January 1968 when the British
Prime Minister announced British forces would be disengaging from the Persian Gulf, and the
Shah expressed a similar desire to abandon the Iranian states ties to the isle.

18 Ali

Rastbeen, The Three Iranian Islands of the Persian Gulf: Based on Documents and Historical Evidence (Paris:
Institut International D'Études Stratégiques, 2008), 141.
19

Rosemarie Said Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates, and Oman (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 82-84.
20
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The nationalization of Iran’s oil will be specifically examined in the following chapter of this analysis.

Roham Alvandi, "Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question, 1968-1970," British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies 37, no. 2 (2010): 162.
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The Persian Gulf Post-1968: Negotiations, Abandonment, and Annexation
The question of why the Shah made the decision to abandon the Iranian claim to Bahrain
in 1968 is not the focus of this analysis, nor does it have a complex answer. In 1968 there was
clear strategic imperative for relinquishing the Iranian states tie to the island. 22 Following the
1967 Six Day War, the Shah felt increasingly ostracized by his neighbors for his lack of support
for the Palestinian cause. Additionally, the British announcement to withdraw all forces from the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula roused fears about a possible vacuum for influence where
the British had been active. The Shah sought to create a regional defense framework for the
Persian Gulf, which would protect Iranian oil transports that accounted for 38 per cent of Iranian
government spending in 1968.23 However, the claim to Bahrain remained an obstacle to
formalizing such an agreement, and it was with these considerations in mind that the Shah found
it key to relinquish the historically-rooted ties between the two territories. 24
This research project aims to explore what happens when territory is abandoned, and
begins by answering the question of why the Shah kept the negotiations concerning the Iranian
claim a secret. What was the process employed to relinquish the claim to the island? Once this
outcome was achieved Iranian troops occupied three additional islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu
Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs. Diplomatic cables identify a possible agreement
between Iran and the United Kingdom which would permit an exchange of territory so this
research also begs the question of whether there was a “deal” in play for Iran to dispose of her
claim to Bahrain and in return get to seize other territory.
22 Alvandi,
23

"Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question," 159-162.

Mark J. Gasiorowski, U.S. foreign policy and the shah: building a client state in Iran (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1991): 102-103.
24

Ibid.
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Chapter one begins by appraising the relationship between Persia and the United
Kingdom in the early twentieth century. I argue that substantial foreign economic activity
fostered an anti-imperialist attitude in Iran, which was further exacerbated by the role of external
governments in overthrowing the democratically elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953. Antiinterventionist and specifically anti-British sentiment shaped the negotiations regarding the
disposal of the Iranian claim to Bahrain in their entirety. Utilizing archival materials I then go on
to piece together the negotiations which took place from January 1968 to March 1970 where the
Shah sought to abandon the Iranian claim. The different phases of the 26 months of diplomacy
will be highlighted, as well as the faulty chronology commonly employed by other scholars.
Following reconstructing the negotiations that led to the Shah disposing of the
longstanding Iranian claim to Bahrain, chapter two employs a thematic account to illustrate
varying motivations, considerations, and long-term goals of the parties involved. I assert that
diplomatic cables and communiqués reveal four key themes. Firstly, domestic politics were
crucial in dictating the course of negotiations for the rulers of both Iran and Bahrain — albeit for
very different reasons. Secondly, it becomes apparent that on both the national and international
level there was anxiety regarding religious dynamics. It will then be shown how the fate of a
security network amongst smaller Gulf states was linked to the outcome of the Bahrain
negotiations. Lastly, critical analysis reveals the Shah, whilst concerned with public opinion,
acted consistently independent from his political advisers.
Chapter three turns to examining whether or not there was a deal crafted in which the
Shah would relinquish the Iranian claim to Bahrain and in return get to seize the islands of Abu
Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs in the Persian Gulf. The fact of the matter is is that on

10
the eve of British formal withdrawal from the region in 1971 Iran laid claim to new territory after
denouncing others, which leaves room for speculation regarding what may have occurred behind
closed doors. I argue that historians have missed documented evidence of a British proposal for a
packaged settlement. However, evidence of a packaged settlement is not proof that territorial
changes were the product of a deal and I conclude that whilst a quid pro quo exchange was
initially put forth there is not enough evidence that this was the groundwork for territorial
changes in November 1971.
Chapter four evaluates these transformations contending that they remain relevant to the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula today. The 2011 uprisings in Bahrain illustrate how a
lingering sense of Iranian identity have served as justification for the systematic discrimination
of the Shia population of Bahrain. Continued threats of annexation by officials in the Iranian
government also serve to heighten tensions between the two states. This chapter exhibits how the
Iranian government’s continued claim of sovereignty over the islands inhabited by Iranian forces
in the autumn of 1971 remains a main point of contention in the relationship between Iran and
the United Arab Emirates.
In conducting this analysis a wide variety of sources are utilized. When engaging with the
negotiations themselves Arabian Boundaries: New Documents, 1966-1975 is employed.25 The
multi-volume series is comprised of diplomatic telegrams, communiqués, and briefings as
exchanged between British diplomatic personnel in the Persian Gulf. As a result of Britain’s
thirty-year rule all correspondence and memorandums have been made public — this includes all

25

Richard Schofield and Elizabeth Evans, eds., Arabian boundaries: new documents : 1966-1975 (Cambridge:
Cambridge Archive Edition, 2009).
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documents then deemed “secret.”26 Beyond providing insight to ongoing debates and the general
negotiation process, the direct quotes of foremost negotiators from Iran and Bahrain as to be
relayed to other embassies gained from this correspondence are invaluable. There is no
accessible historical record in Iran and Bahrain of these negotiations. Inaccessibility of archives,
lack of translation, and limited publishing practices are all contributing factors. In Bahrain, there
is no law governing access to diplomatic archives.27
The oral history projects of Zohreh Sullivan at the University of Illinois, the Center for
Middle Eastern Studies at Harvard University, and the Foundation for Iranian Studies have
additionally lent themselves to making this analysis as rigorous and balanced as possible. The
records respectively provide insight to the silenced narrative of the middle and lower classes
under the reign of the Shah. Furthermore, they offer commentary on the general trends and
transformations of Iranian society in the twentieth century. These interviews provide an intimate
look into the strategies and concerns of prominent diplomatic officials during the negotiations
between 1968 and 1971. The final chapter, which deals with contemporary politics, employs
journalistic sources.

26

The thirty-year rule is a law of the United Kingdom which states that all government papers must be released
publicly thirty years after they have been drafted. Following the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act in 2010,
there is now a twenty-year rule concerning government documents of the United Kingdom. The twenty-year rule
was enacted in August 2013.
27

Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State, "World Wide Diplomatic Archives Index: Bahrain," U.S.
Department of State, https://history.state.gov/countries/archives/bahrain.
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“A Great Civilization involves, in the first instance, a choice.”28
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Shah of Iran
1980

Chapter 1: A Need for Secrecy

Introductory Remarks
On October 28, 1968 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi wrote to Sir Denis Wright, the
British Ambassador to Iran, that in order for the people of Iran to accept his decision to abandon
the Iranian claim it was essential to show it had been dropped in conformity with internationally
recognized procedures.29 After decades of hotly claiming Bahrain was not an independent state
and that it was formally part of Iran, the Shah could not be seen to simply be abandoning
territory with reason. The Iranian government had repeatedly professed, as articulated in Iran’s
1928 petition to the League of Nations written by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
the Bahrain islands belonged to Persia. 30 How then was Iran, seemingly out of nowhere to
relinquish its claim to what some believed to be Persia proper? Furthermore, how was the Shah
to manipulate events so not to appear to be conspiring with the British?
Having established in the introduction that it was from a desire for Arab-Iranian
rapprochement that the Shah sought to abandon Iran’s longstanding claim to Bahrain, this
chapter will examine why and how the Shah went to such lengths to procure the outcome he
28

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's Story, trans. Teresa Waugh (London: Michael Joseph, 1980), 124.

29 Alvandi,
30

"Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question," 168.

Pakrevan, "Protest of the Persian Government Against Article 6 of the Treaty Concluded Between Great Britain
and the Hedjaz on May 20th, 1927," 1360.
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desired. I argue that the long history of foreign economic and political activity in Iran nurtured an
anti-imperialist and anti-interventionist domestic attitude. By engaging with economic
development at the turn of the 20th century and the episode that overthrew the democratically
elected Iranian Prime Minister in 1953 it will be displayed why the Shah felt compelled to keep
the negotiations with British diplomats between 1968 and 1970 shrouded in secrecy. After a
comprehensive analysis of the national landscape I will then reconstruct the phrases of over two
years of diplomacy that culminated in the formal relinquishment of the Iranian claim to Bahrain.

Iran’s Domestic Landscape
Iranian opposition towards foreign interference has its roots in the domestic conditions
at the turn of the twentieth century. Janet Afary, an Iranian academic at the University of
California, Santa Barbara, has succinctly written in her work on the Iranian Constitutional
Revolution31 that “nineteenth-century development in Iran should be characterized as colonial
and dependent, serving the best interests of foreign merchants rather than the native
community.”32 It was not one distinct social class who suffered from Western33 interference in
domestic socio-economic affairs, but all Iranians. The lower classes and the bourgeoisie were
equally afflicted by active foreign economic activity in Iran: peasants could not afford

31

The Persian Constitutional Revolution took place between 1905 and 1906. An immediate outcome of the
revolution was the creation of parliament in Persia, known as the Majlis. For more on the subject see: Nikki R.
Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspective,” The American Historical Review 88, no. 3 (1983):
579-598; and Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran,
and Russia, 1905-1907,” The American Journal of Sociology 100, no. 6 (1995): 1383-1447.
32

Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy & the
Origins of Feminism (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1996), 19.
33

“Western” in this instance does not refer to the countries that constituted the Western bloc during the Cold War. In
Iranian politics “the West” refers to Russia as well. See Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the
Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007).

14
necessities due to price hikes and middle-class merchants lost trading opportunities as a result of
increased foreign import and export practices. During the Constitutional Revolution the
bourgeoisie aimed to curtail foreign investment to protect their own interests.34 Thus, discontent
with foreign involvement in Iran is found across all Iranian social classes at the turn of the
century.
This anti-imperialist stance is very much apparent in Iranian literature. Whilst the
majority of the works produced in the modern period are fictional in content and cannot be
accepted purely as fact, that does not mean they cannot be utilized in historical analysis of the
period. Many works illustrate common themes, motifs, symbols and allusions which display
common opposition to foreign social, economic, and political expansion into Persia, the
Persian Gulf, and the broader Middle East.35 One example of this is a novel The Travel Diary of
Ebrahim Beyg, written in 1902, which tells the tale of an Iranian born and raised in Cairo
who, upon growing up, decides to venture to Iran, where instead of the paradise his father
described Iran to be, finds that:
What is lacking is law. There is no order; hence, the duty of the individual,
including the ruler and the ruled, the subject and the official, is unclear.
For this reason, there are no schools and no taxes, but bribery, dictatorship
and extortion do exist. Cities are left in ruins. Fields are left barren. Waters
are stagnant. It is difficult to walk through the alleys for the stench.
Beggars have become viziers and viziers have turned to be beggars.
Affairs are in the hands of the incompetent. Extortion, turmoil and chaos
are rampant.36
34

Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: New Press, 2007), 77.

35

See M. R. Ghanoonparvar, In a Persian Mirror: Images of the West and Westerners in Iranian Fiction (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1993) and Nahid Mozaffari, Strange Times, My Dear: The PEN Anthology of
Contemporary Iranian Literature (New York: Arcade Pub., 2005) and Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted.
36

Maragheh-’i Zeynol’abdein, Siyahatnameh-ye Ebrahim Beyg (Tehran: Sadaf, 1965/1966) as found in M. R.
Ghanoonparvar, Prophets of Doom: Literature as a Socio-political Phenomenon in Modern Iran (Lanham, M.D.:
University Press of America, 1984), 3.
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Zeynol’abdein Maragheh-‘i’s novel illustrates Iran at the turn of the century and became one of
the most popular texts in Iran because it was accessible to the public as result of its tone,
realism, and basic syntax. 37 The language was not pompous and grandiose as the majority of the
works from the period, and resonated with many Iranians. 38 The work realistically portrayed the state
of the national education system in which there were no school, but more importantly the state of the
government in which bribery and extortion went unchecked. Those in power were not there as a result of
professional qualifications, but qualified pockets.
Already existing domestic opposition towards external actors became exacerbated by the
episode which usurped Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh from power in August 1953. Born in
1882, Mossadegh was a wealthy landowner and lawyer who after many years in public service
was elected in 1920 to the Iranian Parliament, better known as the Majles. He would become
the 60th Prime Minister of Iran with the campaign platform of introducing sweeping social and
political reforms. Included in his progressive campaign was a bill submitted to the Majles to
nationalize the oil industry in Iran. As the leader of the Iranian National Front 39 Mossadegh
was not alone in seeking the expulsion of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) from Iran.
The Islamic clergy welcomed the expulsion of Western corruptive influence from Iran, and
other groups viewed the AIOC as the greatest manifestation of foreign intervention in Iran’s
economy.40 Mossadegh’s bill roused massive domestic support, and on March 20, 1951 the
company was nationalized, taking away both power and profits from the AIOC.

37

Ibid.

38

Ghanoonparvar, Prophets of Doom: Literature as a Socio-political Phenomenon in Modern Iran, 3.
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At the time of nationalization the British government owned 50% of the Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company’s stock and utilized the profits to finance the empire. 41 The company’s oilrefinery at Abadan was itself valued at over £120 million and was Westminster’s single-most
expensive overseas investment. Such financial gains from oil production were key for Britain
who had spent over a quarter of its national wealth during World War II. With the economy
still recovering, the British government could not afford to lose its most lucrative financial
resource.42 British negotiators sought to draw up an agreement that would address many
of Mossadegh’s grievances and reverse nationalization but the proposed settlement
simply offered Iran too little, too late.43
Authorities in London not only objected to Iran’s nationalization as result of the threat
to Britain’s fiscal situation, but also on the theory that oil produced in Iran was rightfully
British. At the time of Mossadegh’s nationalization, high-ranking officials from the United
Kingdom argued that oil found in Iran was not rightfully Iranian. This is evidenced by the
writing of the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Fuel and Power who wrote in a
letter that:
it was British enterprise, skill and effort which discovered oil under the
soil of Persia, which has got the oil out, which has built the refinery, which
has developed markets for Persian oil in 30 or 40 countries, with wharves,
storage tanks and pumps, road and rail tanks, and other distribution
facilities, and also an immense fleet of tankers. This was done at a time
when there was no easy outlet for Persian oil in competition with
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the vastly greater American oil industry.44
Thus, he argues oil was discovered by William Knox D’arcy, an entrepreneur from Newton
Abbot, England, and subsequently refined, produced, and managed by Englishmen for
decades following. The Under-Secretary contends that none of these things could have
occurred if the Persian government and Persian people had been left to their own devices.45
As a result, London authorized a three-track policy consisting of legal maneuvers
economic sanctions, and planning of covert operations to reverse nationalization.46 Beginning
in the spring of 1951 Britain strategized with the pursuit of, as succinctly articulated by the
historian Mark Gasiorowski, “reestablish[ing] their control over Iran’s oil by either pressuring
Mosaddeq into a favorable settlement or by removing him from office.”47 Endeavors
undertaken over the following months included making legal appeals to the International Court
of Justice and the United States; a production slowdown by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company;
laying off 20,000 Iranian oil workers at the Abadan oil fields; and pressuring the Shah to install
other politicians in Mossadegh’s place.48 These tactics proved futile, and the dispute remained
unresolved.
In autumn of 1951 British officials registered a complaint against Iran on behalf of the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company at the meeting of the United Nations Security Council. The British
were up in arms, and whilst expressing his refusal to negotiate with representatives of the
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Foreign Office Mossadegh came before the United Nations in October to utilize what he called,
“the ultimate refuge of weak and oppressed nations”49 in hope of once and for all ceasing any
claim Britain had to Iran’s oil production facilities. Mossadegh commented on the socioeconomic state of affairs in Iran and the history of the AIOC’s operations, saying that in the
year 1948 alone the company’s accounts revealed that whilst its net value was sixty-one million
pounds Iran only received nine million. The Iranian governments yield was three times less
than the twenty eight million pounds that were awarded to the British treasury as a result of
income tax alone.50 Mossadegh made his case to the Council, as he had to the international
community prior, for the complete and continued nationalization of oil production in Iran.
At the 560th meeting of the Security Council British officials slandered Mossadegh’s
nationalist stance, characterizing the Iranian approach to negotiations as wholeheartedly
negative.51 Defamatory statements were exchanged by all parties, and on the third and final
day of the session the Iranian Ambassador to the United States stated on Mossadegh’s behalf
that the company would never again operate in Iran through trusteeship nor contract.52 The
session of the United Nations Security Council voted to postpone discussion of the subject,
leaving the British without their desired result and embarrassed on the international stage.
When Mossadegh first arrived in New York, President Harry Truman embraced him and
applauded his strength to combat imperialism. With such a pleasant exchange between leaders,
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and American political passivity towards the oil debacle in Iran, why then did American
decision makers coordinate intervention in Iranian domestic politics just a year following? The
answer is found in examining the philosophy of political actors during the Cold War. In the
midst of greater conflict with the U.S.S.R. Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey made up the
“Northern Tier” strategy in which the countries would act as a blockade between Russia and the
rest of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. 53 By the time Dwight Eisenhower succeeded
Truman some in the administration were no longer assured that the Iranian people universally
supported Mossadegh as they had prior. The domestic landscape had transformed, and fearing
cracks in their strategy to combat communism and Soviet Union the United States became
involved; forever changing the course of Iran’s political future.
The Eisenhower administration’s concerns are illustrated in a policy proposal crafted by
the United States National Security Council in November, 1952 which highlights the
opportunities for Soviet infiltration in Iran.54 The timing of this policy is of great relevance for it
was written just weeks following the expulsion of the British diplomatic service upon
Mossadegh’s discovery of British plans to overthrow him. 55 With the Foreign Office no longer
able to “unilaterally to assure stability” members of the U.S. National Security Council felt that the
U.S.S.R. might gain political control of Iran.56 The latter statement was supported by the fact that the
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pan-Iranist party which was once united behind Mossadegh and his democratic aims was now
split into two factions: pro– and anti–Mossadegh. 57 Furthermore, the Prime Minister had nearly
exhausted Iran’s financial reserves and spending was exceeding revenue; a practice not
conducive to delivering on the promises of economic and social betterment which he had
pledged to make a reality. 58 The American government could no longer be certain that
Mossadegh would be able to retain control, and the possibility of someone from the communist
Tudeh party ascending in domestic politics was viewed as too threatening to ignore. Thus, in
August 1953, President Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency of the United
States to initiate Operation AJAX. Led by Kermit Roosevelt Jr., the grandson of President
Theodore Roosevelt, the planned coup succeeded in overthrowing Mosadegh in August 1953.59
Whilst the British government had been conspiring to such ends since Mossadegh’s nationalization
of the oil industry, for America the decision to usurp the Prime Minister had its origins with the
security of his rule in the context of the Cold War. Despite their differing motivations the people of
Iran would always remember the interference of America and the United Kingdom in Iran’s domestic
politics and their decisive role in determining the future trajectory of political authority in Iran.
The Shah’s loyalty to the Iranian people was increasingly coming into question, and as
noted by one of the subjects of Sullivan’s oral history project after Mossadegh was overthrown
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an air of illegitimacy hung around the Shah.60 This came greatly as the result of his increasingly
militaristic policies and autocratic rule pursued following the coup.61 Instances of
disappearance, torture, and death became the norm as American support allowed for the creation
of the military police and intelligence network known as SAVAK.62 A month after the
Mossadegh had been usurped and the Shah’s authority centralized a U.S. colonel
working for the Central Intelligence Agency came to Iran to aid the Military Governor of Tehran
in training an initial security squad in techniques for intelligence, surveillance, and
interrogation.63 As recounted by Hussein Fardust, who later served as the Deputy Head of
SAVAK, it was at this time that the small team assisted with liquidating the Shah’s opponents
through the discovery and eradication of oppositional groups.64
The extent SAVAK’s control over the Iranian domestic climate is illustrated by an article
published in the New York Times in 1958. Six days following the military coup which murdered
the king of Iraq and brought two generals to power the American newspaper ran a piece on
Iran’s domestic landscape, and sought to examine if a similar coup would be possible in the
neighboring country of Iran.65 The article stated that no internal subversion would be possible in
Iran, with the Shah retaining complete personal control. In regards to the opinion of the Iranian
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people, The New York Times commented that “Iranians say that the Savak (secret police) is so
efficient that a conspiracy in the army similar to the one that overthrew King Faisal of Iraq
would be unthinkable here.”66
Five years later the Shah implemented a series of national reforms known as the
White Revolution and which included the expansion of a land reform program, the
nationalization of forests and pastures, the enfranchisement of women, and a rural literacy
program.67 These reforms were ratified to appease public opinion and ensure the stability and
durability of the regime. 68 However, the resiliency of the regime was also solidified by the
expansion of SAVAK. Any expression of sentiment seemingly in opposition to the Shah and
more broadly the government faced serious repercussions. The award winning Polish journalist
Ryszard Kapuściński’s wrote that “all walls can have ears and every door or gate can lead to the
secret police.”69 His words poignantly illustrated the reality in Iran and the overwhelming sense
of fear, loss, and powerlessness, that:
Whoever fell into the grip of that organization disappeared without a trace,
sometimes forever. People would vanish suddenly and nobody would
know what had happened to them, where to go, whom to ask, whom to
appeal to. They might be locked up in a prison, but which one? There were
six thousand. An invisible, adamant wall would rise up, before which you
stood helpless, unable to take a step forward. Iran belonged to SAVAK, but
within the country the police acted like an under-ground organization that
appeared then disappeared, hiding its tracks, leaving no forwarding
address.70
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An Amnesty International report estimates that before the fall of the Shah as many as 25,000 to
100,000 political prisoners were subject to interrogation and torture at the hands of the
state-sponsored internal repression mechanism.71
In 1953 in order to preserve their national interests, America and the United Kingdom
interfered in Iran’s domestic affairs. In its place, they solidified and centralized the power of
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. He constructed a repressive state in which the masses of Iran saw
their harsh reality as a result of the foreign intervention, and harbored increasing resentment
towards both America and the United Kingdom. Thus, in relinquishing Iran’s claim to Bahrain
— a stance politicians in London had urged for decades — it was crucial for the Shah to not
seem as to be at the bidding of London. It was of utmost importance for the Shah to have the
veil of “internationally recognized procedures”72 as articulated by the Iranian Ambassador to
Iran to the Foreign Office in October 1968. However, simply agreeing on an international
approach to renouncing Iran’s territory did not prescribe a course of action to be undertaken
and earlier that year such an approach was not even under consideration by the Shah.

The Negotiations
The twenty six months of shuttle diplomacy that would formally dispose of the Iranian
states claim to Bahrain began in January 1968. In a meeting with the Shah in the first week of the
new year, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs announced the Prime Minister’s
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decision to withdraw all British troops from the Persian Gulf. The Shah himself voiced a desire
to abandon the longstanding Iranian claim, contending that a public referendum such as a
plebiscite, which examined Bahraini public opinion would be necessary.73 This initiated
continued conversations between the Shah and diplomatic officials in Tehran and London. As
documented by the British Ambassador to Iran in his annual review that year, the Shah was
incredibly anxious about the possibility of going “down in history as the man who lightly
abandoned his country’s ‘14th Province’”74 yet remained adamant about wanting to relinquish
Iran’s longstanding claim. Beginning in January 1968 all conversations in regards to Bahrain
centered around the Shah’s determination to hold a plebiscite which would serve as justification
for relinquishing formal ties to the islands.
However, a plebiscite would not prove to be a viable option. Since the Shah first
proposed this course of action the Emir of Bahrain, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalifah (r. 1961 1999),75 objected for he believed it would trigger domestic violence and that any introduction
of procedures aiming to gauge the social attitude would spur further chaos.76 Such sentiments
were relayed vis-à-vis British diplomatic staff. Since the Iranian government did not
recognize the independent status of the Bahraini government, there could not be direct
negotiations between the parties.77 As a result, British ambassadors and diplomatic officials
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served as intermediaries for the duration of the negotiations. Following initial conversations
in January 1968 the Foreign Office came to view a public referendum as an unfeasible
option, as the Emir of Bahrain had argued. Any sort of plebiscite would not be acceptable for
it could not, with certainty, bring about the relinquishment of Iran’s claim.78
Roham Alvandi remains the only historian to engage critically with the
negotiations over Iran’s claim to Bahrain and he has constructed a timeline for the
negotiations which I prove to be not entirely accurate. In his analysis he contends that
from January to August 1968 all discussions were concerned with the Shah’s wish for
a plebiscite and that by December he had agreed to forgo one.79 As late as the end of
August, in a meeting with the British Ambassador to Iran stationed in Tehran, the
Shah expressed in regards to Bahrain that “historically I’ve got a claim to it, and
therefore, if I’m going to give it up . . . I must have some face saving formula.”80 The Shah
remained committed to relinquishing Iran’s claim to Bahrain through a plebiscite or public
referendum. Similarly, the Ambassador acknowledged that right up until December 1968
conversations regarding Bahrain remained at an impasse due because of a possible
plebiscite.81 The Shah’s call for a public referendum did not cease in August 1968 as Alvandi
asserts, but extended into the later months of the year.
Right before Christmas, however, progress was made. The Shah became receptive to
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the idea of utilizing the United Nations as the disposal of the Iranian states claim to Bahrain
which had not yet been suggested. 82 He agreed in secret to forgo a plebiscite in its entirety,
and in the first week of the new year made an announcement that shocked negotiators and
citizens alike. When asked about Bahrain at a press conference in New Delhi he responded
that “I won’t enter into details now but anything that will be the expression of the will of the
people of Bahrain, we, you, the world will recognise as the will of the people of that
Island.”83 Whilst representatives of the British Foreign Office, including the British Ambassador to Iran,
were aware the Shah had been responsive to the proposed course to abandon the Iranian claim the Shah
had given the impression it would be a long time before this could occur due to the need to educate public
opinion.84 Publicly expressing his willingness to let the people of Bahrain decide their own
destiny in January 1969, he signaled a new phase of negotiations in which the parties
involved began to seriously consider how to deal with the claim on the international stage.
Both the Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain had accepted exploring the idea of
using the United Nations but dozens of procedural questions remained unanswered.85
Therefore, between January and August 1969 discussions were concerned with the intricacies
that would be key in generating the outcome all desired: the relinquishment of Iran’s claim to
Bahrain.86 Would the United Nations simply send a representative? Correspondence reveals a
82
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debate amongst British diplomats over whom would be a better candidate: a Venezuelan or a
Pakistani.87 Perhaps instead it would be better to employ the International Court of Justice —
the judiciary service of the United Nations. However, putting cases before the Court would
required the production of genuine legal documents, and the ruling could not be predicted
both in terms of jurisdiction and substance. Even the British, seemingly with the most power
on the international stage, readily admitted that proceedings put before the Court could not
be fixed so there would be no certainty that the found result would be a Bahraini desire to be
independent of Iran.88 Additionally, if the Court route were pursued, who would petition the
claim? Bahrain was not a Statute of the Court and as such did not possess the right and Iran
was out of the question.89 The British Foreign Office conducted studies regarding the
feasibility of multiple options including negotiation, arbitration or adjudication, and United
Nations involvement.90 The Iranians, meanwhile, were adamant on having the authority of
United Nations Security Council. All proposals suggested seemingly came with too much
risk and none were willing to leave anything to chance.
The solution was found in a modified arrangement of a plan of British origin, but
eventually Bahraini-proposed joint Anglo-Iranian approach to the Secretary-General of the
United Nations U Thant. The Shah had objected to this proposal on the basis that if the United
87
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Kingdom and Iran appealed to the United Nations in unison, it would appear that they were
colluding together which was unacceptable to the Shah who was extremely conscious of how
the Iranian public would perceive events. The Shah therefore modified the proposal, suggesting
that Iran make the sole approach to the United Nations, and once the mission to Bahrain had
occurred, the United Nations Security Council would authorize its findings. This formula
provided the the Shah cover for his decision to abandon the Iranian claim and gave him the
legitimacy of an international body.91 Furthermore, the overall abandonment of the notion of a
plebiscite would be shifted from the Shah to the United Nations, keeping the Shah’s image
intact.92
By April 1969 diplomatic personnel from London, Tehran, and Manama had accepted
this approach. However, the question persisted of how the Shah was to petition the claim to
the United Nations and what methodology was to be employed to gauge the wishes of the
Bahraini people. The question of procedure stalled negotiations for months for whilst the
Shah wanted to leave all matters to the Secretary-General, British and Bahraini diplomats
were committed to having the whole procedure scripted. For months no parties would budge
as one British official noted:
We are receiving a mass of telegrams and savingrams about the
negotiations on this subject. We are very grateful to be kept informed but it
is a highly complex affair of drafts, counter-drafts and counter-counterdrafts, bandied about among the five parties to the negotiations; and my
head for one is beginning to spin.93
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Members of the Foreign Office were assured that a deadlock had been reached that was
unable to be broken by drafting alone.94 The Shah, despite supporting the general usage
of the United Nations, refused to commit to drafting specifics of a mission to Bahrain.
He believed that if he did so he would run risk for being publicly exposed as an architect
of Iranian relinquishment. Alvandi argues that out of a wish to move forward the Shah
agreed to compromise on the methodology to be employed.95 Thus, on September 2
1969, the Shah told the British Ambassador, Sir Denis Wright, that given he was kept in
ignorance British and Bahraini diplomatic personnel could dictate the modes of
procedure for the future mission. 96
However, the Secretary-General could not allow the Shah to claim such such blind
ignorance. U Thant made clear that the only way he would allow a formal petition to send a
United Nations mission to Bahrain was if there was first a secret, informal approach to his
offices made by representatives of both Iran and Britain. He contended that this would ensure
general agreement regarding the procedures that would soon follow and would serve as an
insurance mechanism to hold all parties accountable before it turned into a public affair.97 The
Shah remained committed to being absent from the process of planning and the principal
Iranian negotiator Amir Khosrow Afshar told the British Ambassador in Tehran that “if U
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Thant communicated the method of operation to the Iranian Government in any form, written
or oral, formal or informal and even if someone just whispered in Vakil’s98 ear, the Iranians
would say that they were opposed to this method of operation.” The Secretary-General therefore
did not ask the Iranian diplomats to sign a memorandum as he had demanded prior, but instead
opted to ask for a vague summary to which the diplomats obliged. With a nonspecific brief
crafted, the following morning an official memorandum of the anticipated United Nations
mission to Bahrain was delivered to the Iranian embassy in New York. 99
With an informal approach concluded, the last and final stage of negotiations over Iran’s
claim to Bahrain began; lasting from December 1969 till March 1970. During this time all
parties were concerned with the wording of Iran’s formal approach to the United Nations and
Secretary- General U Thant. The language had to be legitimate, yet vague enough to allow for
the engineered result. For three months all negotiators struggled over what consequences varied
phrasings such as “wishes of the inhabitants” and “future status” might have.100 For example,
the word “report” was substituted by more abstract “findings.”101 Events could not proceed
until all options were exhausted in finding the most perfect choice — a seemingly common
theme throughout the entirety of the negotiations.
On March 9, 1970 Mehdi Vakil, the Permanent Representative of Iran to the United
Nations formally delivered his petition to the Secretary-General. He expressed in writing the
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Iranian desire to have “the wishes of the people of Bahrain . . . ascertained through Your
Excellency’s good offices” and a willingness to accept their findings after they had been
endorsed by the United Nations Security Council.102 Adhering to a pre-established timetable,
the British soon gave their additional formal support to the Mission of the United Nations to
Bahrain.103 The Shah had prepared the people of Iran for the outcome he had helped to
engineer through distributing pamphlets amongst the armed forces, the civil service, and
universities which detailed why the Iranian claim was unsound.104 Similarly, the Emir of
Bahrain had compiled a list of acceptable Bahraini institutions and clubs105 which would be
appropriate to solicit opinion from.106 After twenty six months of dealing with how Iran was
to relinquish its claim and what methodology was to be employed to achieve such an aim,
deliberations concluded.
On May 11, 1970, all delegates of the United Nations Security Council voted to adopt
the procured findings of the Secretary-Generals appointed mission to Bahrain. Lord Caradon,
the British Ambassador to the United Nations, went so far as to say before the Council that it
was unnecessary to speak in detail about the vote which had been taken that day. “The task is
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completed; the object attained; the success achieved.”107 In January of 1968 Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi was adamant about relinquishing the Iranian claim to the islands. It had taken
over two years of thoughtful deliberation between authorities of the United Kingdom, Bahrain,
and Iran, but as of May 11, 1970 the Iranian claim could be justifiably abandoned.

Concluding Remarks
Through tracing the rise of foreign economic actors light was shed on the antiimperialist and anti-interventionist nature of the Iranian domestic landscape at the turn of the
twentieth century. This attitude was exacerbated by the continued role of external forces in
overthrowing the Iranian Prime Minister in 1953, and centralizing the Shah’s authority through
support for the institutionalized military police network SAVAK. Such an examination was
imperative to understanding why the Shah was vehement about keeping negotiations between
1968 and 1970 entirely secret.
Using diplomatic cables to reconstruct the negotiations, I highlighted the different
phases of the shuttle diplomacy that led to the relinquishment of the historically-rooted Iranian
claim to Bahrain. After learning of the British intent to withdraw all forces from the Persian
Gulf by 1971, the Shah made clear in secret his desire to dispose of Iranian ties to the island of
Bahrain. The Shah’s initial discussions with the British representatives over the claim were
only concerned with holding a public referendum in Bahrain to ascertain the wishes of the
people. Out of uncertainty that this would bring about the desired result, and objections from

107

UN Security Council document No. S/PV1536, extracts from the Provisional Verbatim Record of the Fifteen
Hundred and Thirty-Sixth meeting held at HQ, New York, on Monday, 11 May 1970, at 3pm, 11 May 1970 as found
in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 10: 543.

33
the Emir of Bahrain, such a procedure was ruled out. Instead, all parties agreed to explore
utilizing the United Nations. After hashing out logistics and technicalities in the summer of
1969 diplomats of Iran and the United Kingdom made a secret, joint informal approach to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations which was followed by a public, formal approach by
just Iran once debates over approach and wording had been resolved. This reconstruction also
highlighted the false chronology of other scholars. Now that I have detailed how precisely the
negotiations unfolded I will turn to recurrent themes as a lens for understanding varying parties
strategic motivations, the course of the negotiations themselves, and consequential outcomes.

34
“Between ourselves, do you suppose that we are acting as traitors
to our country by going ahead with this settlement over Bahrain?” 108
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Shah of Iran
1970

Chapter 2: Deconstructing Diplomacy

Introductory Remarks
In analyzing the discussions over the island of Bahrain which took place from January
1968 to March 1971 some topics appear intrinsic to the relinquishment of the Iranian claim.
Having established how these negotiations unfolded, a thematic account will now be employed
to illustrate varying motivations, considerations, and long-term goals. In reading cables and
communiqués there are four distinct themes that prove key to a comprehensive analysis of the
deliberations: the importance of domestic politics and opinion in dictating the course of
negotiations for the rulers of both Iran and Bahrain — albeit for very different reasons; a
concern for religious dynamics in both a national and international context; the fate of a
security network amongst smaller Gulf states as linked to the outcome of the Bahrain
negotiations; and lastly, the fact that throughout the negotiations the Shah consistently acted
independently from his political advisers.
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Domestic Politics
Whilst international politics encouraged the Shah to abandon his claim to Bahrain
publicly in January 1969 it was domestic politics that dictated the ways and means for
negotiations to occur.109 In critically analyzing the discussions that took place with British
diplomatic staff it becomes apparent that both Iranian and Bahraini negotiators were motivated
in their actions by domestic considerations. The rulers of both states were occupied with how
their populations would react to both the absence of an Iranian claim to Bahrain, and how the
desired outcome would be achieved. However, whilst the Shah was motivated to provide
justification for the relinquishment of Iran’s claim and engage with the attitude of the Iranian
public, the Emir actively sought to stifle the opportunity for public opinion to be expressed.
Both rulers were greatly concerned with their constituents, but for completely opposing
reasons.
Beginning in early 1968 the Shah had made it clear to the British Foreign Office in
private that he remained eager to dispose of the Iranian government’s claim to Bahrain and
sought a public referendum to satisfy public opinion.110 After the Shah agreed to forgo seeking
a plebiscite, remarks from the meetings of the British Ambassador to Iran and the Iranian
Deputy Minister reveal an ongoing concern for appeasing the Iranian public. The latter
expressed that the then current British proposal to make an enquiry through the United Nations
would not satisfy public opinion in Iran.111 Throughout the duration of negotiations, the
109
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Foreign Office was forced to reposition proposals based on the fact that they did “not really
provide a sufficient framework within which the Shah can publicly get off the hook of his
claim to Bahrain”112 which was a non-negotiable prerequisite.
From the onset of the Shah’s decision to renounce Iran’s longstanding claim, to debates
over methodology, the Shah was occupied with making sure the Iranian public recognized that
the matter was a formal legal procedure. Indeed, even after negotiations had been finalized in
February 1970 the Shah still turned to his trusted childhood friend and advisor, Asadollah
Alam, for assurances about public opinion, asking if “between ourselves, do you suppose that
we are acting as traitors to our country by going ahead with this settlement over Bahrain?”113
All steps of the Shah’s deliberations over the future of the Bahraini claim reflect deep
consideration for how the Iranian public would interpret such events. Additionally, it forced
British diplomats in their shuttle diplomacy to be constantly aware of how to provide sufficient
justification for the Shah to abandon the historically-rooted claim.114
During this process the Emir was constantly reflecting over how the public would react to possible
plans for gauging opinion. From the onset of negotiations in 1968 the ruler of Bahrain was vocal
about his concern over the introduction of new legislative mechanisms in Bahraini society. As
noted in correspondence from the British Political Agent in Bahrain the Emir was greatly
engrossed by what the involvement of the UN in the form of a representative to test opinion
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might instigate domestically.115 Bahrain had never had any representative institutions, so to
then to initiate the process of composing electoral rolls and arranging voting procedures as to
be gauged by a representative of the United Nations could bring unforeseen risks to the
stability of the territory.116 Even the British Ambassador to Iran acknowledged that Bahrain
simply had “no means of having a referendum” and the logistics of implementing one would
be simply unfeasible.117 Whilst there is no documentation of the Emir explicitly stating a desire
to keep the monarchy secure, in the midst of a period that had seen the overthrow of multiple
monarchial regimes in the Middle East, one cannot overlook the motivation he had to keep
ahold of his throne.118 Even the British Political Agent in Bahrain went so far as to comment
that long-term future of the Emir’s regime was intertwined with the Bahraini-Iranian
dispute.119
In addition to concern for the monarchy and the introduction of democratic principles
the Emir was anxious about how encouraging active expression of public opinion might
instigate violence amongst the split Sunni–Shia population of Bahrain.120 This attitude was not
limited to the Emir himself. A senior translator at the British Political Agency in Bahrain, a selfdescribed archetypal middle class Sunni made a comment to the Second Secretary of the
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Agency in which he stated a similar concern for the delicate social climate saying that he hoped
nothing like the proposed referendum would ever happen in Bahrain.121 Manama was still
recovering from a series of bloody religious clashes which had erupted fourteen years prior.122
Throughout the population of Bahrain there remained lingering feelings of distrust. 123 Whilst the Bahraini
public was not privy to negotiations over a possible plebiscite like this translator, his attitude
hints at underlying fears of erupting sectarian violence.

The Religious Dimension
The religious component was not only of concern to the Emir during the negotiations
but also British diplomats who had anxiety about how a plebiscite might play out in Bahrain.
The British aim in negotiations was not only to help facilitate the ways and means for the Shah
to relinquish the claim to Bahrain, but to leave stability in the wake of their withdrawal. There
was still religious tension and also a fear that the Shia community of Bahrain would vote to be
considered part of Iran out of both dislike and distrust of the Sunni community.124 Such an
outcome would not be conducive to the Shah abandoning the territorial claim — which he was
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anxious to do.125 Furthermore, negotiating personnel from London consistently
articulate a concern for temperament of the Bahraini domestic climate. Over 30 pages
of diplomatic correspondence reveal concern for how the number of men sent to
Bahrain to engage with domestic opinion could, depending on the number sent, further
agitate the social landscape.126
The early stages of negotiation were inexplicably tied to the existing religious
dynamic. The religious component of Bahraini society could not be ignored, and domestic
politics remained a key consideration in the ways and means to relinquish Iran’s claim to
Bahrain. Whilst the Emir of Bahrain was concerned with the domestic religious situation the
Shah of Iran and the foremost British negotiators were conscious of the broader regional
climate concerning Shia and Sunni Islam. In the recent years Britain had adopted a strategy of
balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia — respective bastions of Sunni and Shia Islam in the Middle
East —against each other to maintain regional stability.127 The same philosophy was behind
the British desire to create a security network for the smaller states of the Persian Gulf which
was additionally supported by both the Saudi and Iranian governments.

The United Arab Emirates
Just as concern for domestic politics cannot be ignored in analyzing the negotiations
over Iran’s relinquishment of the claim to Bahrain neither can a different political agenda: the
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creation of the United Arab Emirates which was established in December 1971. The
deliberations regarding the Iranian governments territorial claim to Bahrain directly influenced
the establishment of the federation of emirates, and vice versa. It is necessary to engage with
the transforming socio-political dynamics prompted by Egyptian president Gamel Abd alNasser128 to display why the majority of political actors in the Persian Gulf — both small gulf
states and their more powerful neighbors — viewed the institution of security network as key
to establishing long-term regional stability.
In 1952 Nasser assumed power as the result of a coup d’etat which overthrew the
Egyptian monarchy. 129 During his lengthy tenure as President the charismatic leader
would be a proponent of the non-alignment movement, Arab nationalism, Arab
socialism, and pan-Arab ideologies with the aim of spreading these anti-colonial
nationalist philosophies throughout the Arab world.130 Nasser believed that the Arab states
needed to work together to purge the region from foreign influence. All monarchies of Middle
East were perceived as a continuation of Western influence, instilled by the West and pawns of
the West, and thus Nasser sought to replace them with radical republican regimes. 131
The rulers of Iran and Saudi Arabia shared a concern for the spread of revolutionary
activities in the Persian Gulf as evidenced by examining their joint efforts to counter Nasser’s
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active participation in the North Yemen Civil War between 1962 and 1970.132 On September 19,
1962 Imam Ahmad of Yemen died and his son ascended to the throne. Prince Muhammad alBadr was proclaimed Imam and King but he did not exercise his newfound powers for long,
for not even an entire week passed before the commander of the Imam’s bodyguard,
Abdullah al-Sallal133 launched a coup.134 Yemen was proclaimed a republic with the Council
of the Revolutionary Command becoming the preceding government.135 Unlike the
revolutions in Egypt (in 1952) and Iraq (in 1958), the usurped monarch was able to escape
and it was from this position he was able to rally support amongst the tribes still loyal to the
monarch with the aim of reclaiming his throne. The divided political climate quickly
escalated into a full-fledged civil war between supporters of the monarchy and oppositional
republican forces. The turmoil in Yemen represented for Nasser the opportunity for antimonarchial forces to prevail, and a chance to renew his revolutionary credentials.136 In
pursuit of rapidly centralizing the power of the republican forces Nasser quickly dispatched
both men and materiel to the leaders of the newly proclaimed Yemen Arab Republic. At the
height of Egyptian involvement there were over 70,000 members of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force fighting on behalf of the new republican regime and this support
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would continue until 1967.137
Egypt was not the only country supporting factions in Yemen. In the past Nasser had
sponsored efforts in Saudi Arabia and Jordan to undermine the standing monarchies of the
Middle East, and these countries remained wary of what effect the spread of revolutionary
uprisings might have on their own regimes.138 For however long there was a radical republican
government on Saudi Arabia’s border there remained a threat to the security of the throne. Thus,
as Nasser armed al-Sallal’s republican forces Saudi Arabia’s King Faisal (r. 1964 -1975) 139 began
to channel both money and weapons to those loyal to the Yemeni monarch with the hope of
having his throne restored.140 Iran additionally sponsored royalist activity on and off during the
civil war. King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was motivated by concern for the security of his rule, and
the Shah was driven by a fear of the spread of Arab nationalism for Iran was not an Arab state. Egypt
was, therefore, a common enemy for both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Whilst limited in their
cooperation, they both aimed to curb pan-Arabism and prevent political instability in the region.
The fear of a regional political vacuum was exacerbated the British Prime Minister’s
announcement in January 1968 that by 1971 United Kingdom was to withdraw all of its troops
from the Persian Gulf. Historians disagree on one specific explanation of the decision citing the
paradigm of domestic politics, a desire to focus on Europe as opposed to the empire, domestic
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institutional inertia, and maintaining party unity as possible causes. 141 William Roger Louis argues that
the British left the Gulf as part of a broader plan to limit spending to rescue the British economy.142 The British
pound had been recently devalued from $2.80 to $2.40, and ending the presence of troops east of
Suez was viewed as a way to cut government spending. 143 Despite varying historical
interpretations, the declaration was made and the plan of policy was adhered to. Following the
British decision to “withdraw” from the Gulf one question remained: what was to be the fate of
the trucial states?144 British forces were not only serving as protection for national oil interests
but also aiming to maintain general stability. 145
For nearly a century states in the Persian Gulf had been protectorates of the United
Kingdom. The emirates themselves feared the leave of the British as but an opportunity for
greater powers of the region to vie for political dominance in their territory. On separate
occasions the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai contacted the Foreign Office offering to fund
the cost of having British troops remain in the region.146 However, due to disputes amongst the
British Labour Party and domestic economic difficulties the Secretary of State for Defense
declined. What then was to be course of action upon formal British disengagement from the
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region? The United Kingdom wanted to preserve their respective interests, and saw a solution
in the established independence of Bahrain and Qatar, and their joint membership in a newly
created federation which would include the seven trucial states.147
The British desire for this union was motivated by the belief a formal federation would
counter competing quests for dominance in the Persian Gulf — namely between Saudi Arabia
and Iran. After the Six Day War the Foreign Office no longer perceived Egypt as its greatest
threat, but rather by a possible rivalry for regional dominance between Riyadh and Tehran.148
The creation of a federation of the seven trucial states, Bahrain and Qatar would therefore be
an assurance to the stability of the Gulf and British oil interests.149 The British were motivated
to be instigators and facilitators in the process of Iran relinquishing the claim to Bahrain
because its status determined the fate of regional stability. The hope of generating an outcome
favorable to their own interest motivated the United Kingdom to play such an active role in the
negotiations over territory in the Persian Gulf.
Despite the Foreign Office’s belief that Saudi Arabia would utilize British withdrawal
as a chance to further assert her own interest, the Saudi King viewed the decision with
similar disdain to the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. He remarked to Herman Eilts, the
American Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, of his anxiety concerning British disengagement and
“railed against [the] Labour government’s ‘irresponsibility.’”150 Once it appeared that the
British stance could not be swayed, Faisal embraced the notion of a federation in its
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embryonic stage and continued to support it in the years following. In an interview with the
New York Times in May 1968 the King remarked that there was no need for a political
vacuum with anticipated British departure.151 Faisal viewed Arab socialism espoused by
Nasser as of the utmost threat to the stability of his rule for it sought the fall of all monarchies in the
region. The creation of the federation of Arab emirates would therefore limit the Gulf states
individual susceptibility to these external threats, and as a result King Faisal became an
active proponent of the federation that would become the United Arab Emirates.
Iran could not recognize or support a union as it was originally proposed by the rulers
of the seven trucial states of Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Sharjah, Umm al-Quwain, Ras alKhaimah, and Fujairah, in conjunction with Bahrain and Qatar.152 The reason for this was
because amongst those wanting to create an Arab federation was Bahrain — who, as detailed
earlier, Iran viewed as an Iranian province. However, the Iranian objection to the
establishment of what would become the United Arab Emirates should not be construed as a
complaint against the institution of such a security network in the Gulf. Rather, the Shah
viewed it of the utmost importance such a framework exist to limit the ability of other
regional powers to gain influence. 153 The small states of the Gulf, whilst wealthy as a result
of oil and mineral concessions, did not have the resources to protect themselves from the
military might of their larger neighbors. However, the formation of such a political
confederation was remained unacceptable to Iran, as long as their claim to Bahrain was
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undisposed of.154
With a united stance against the spread of Nasser’s political ideologies King Faisal of
Saudi Arabia and the Shah of Iran sought to create a regional security network for the emirates of
the Gulf. Whilst following the Six-Day War Nasser’s diminished reputation and power was
recognized, there was still fear of a political vacuum. 155 Additionally, the Shah was becoming
increasingly concerned with Iraq’s aggressive regional ambitions.156 The creation of such a
federation would prevent both the spread of Nasserism and the further subversion of monarchial
regimes. Additionally, it would maintain security of smaller Gulf states who were not
individually capable of protecting themselves. Throughout the duration of the negotiations, the
fate of Iran’s claim to Bahrain appears to be intimately intertwined with the establishment of
what would be the United Arab Emirates.

The Shah: An Independent Actor?
In thematically illustrating the negotiations over Bahrain which took place between
January 1968 and March 1970 there is one last point that cannot be ignored; namely, the Shah
as a politician independent of his advisers. As established in the first thematic deconstruction
the Shah was greatly constrained in his decision-making by his regard for domestic opinion of
his actions. However, when it came to decision-making amongst those holding office the Shah
repeatedly acted autonomously, often taking a different stance than his advisers and foreign
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ministers. Diplomatic cables serve as evidence, as in one episode where after the Shah had
publicly committed himself to abandoning the Iranian claim to Bahrain the Iranian Minister of
Foreign Affairs heatedly objected, contending that Bahrain was as much a part of Iran as
Surrey was of England. 157 Multiple high level diplomatic officials did not wish for the Shah to
succeed with relinquishing the Iranian claim. The Shah’s commitment to disposal shows that during
this time he was a figure crafting policy alone and not giving in to the political wishes of others. His
decision making process, as argued by Roham Alvandi who is the only scholar to analyze the
Bahrain negotiations, reflects an ability not to be hindered by the opinions of his upper level
officials.158
The notion of the Shah acting independently throughout the Bahrain negotiations is
supported when examining the circle of those involved in the deliberations. Whilst the decision
to abandon the Iranian claim to Bahrain was initially the Shah and the Shah’s alone, following
that commitment there was the opportunity to widen the circle of those involved. However, an
entire year after this pledge Abbas Aram, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Kingdom, had
been kept in the dark by his own government and did not know of any developments regarding
Bahrain. At this point the Shah had resolved to both forgo a plebiscite and to explore
international options.159
In analyzing hundreds of diplomatic cables exchanged between the British Resident in
the Gulf and members of various British embassies in the region it is repeatedly expressed that
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personnel should have a complete disregard for the comments of high-level Iranian officials.
In March 1969 the Shah embarked on his annual holiday to go skiing in Switzerland with his
family. Soon after he departed from Tehran a prominent state official made a comment in a
meeting with British diplomats and stated that Iran might consider physical action to reinforce
that Bahrain was formally part of Iran.160 The British diplomatic authorities in Tehran gave his
words little consideration. A high-level member of the British Foreign Office commented that
“what matters is exchanges with the Shah and not the various moves of Iranian officials”161
suggesting that the comments of Iranian officials could almost be disregarded wholeheartedly.
Over time the Foreign Office eventually came to the conclusion that it was only
conversations with the Shah that truly mattered. 162 These episodes highlight how whilst the
Shah was at all times thinking about how the Iranian people would perceive his actions, he
repeatedly acted independently from his most prominent political advisers whose opinions
diverged from his own.163

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a thematic approach illustrated the importance of domestic politics and
public opinion to both the Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain in contrasting ways.
Throughout the duration of the negotiations over the disposal of the historically-rooted claim
160

Foreign Office Minute by A.A. Acland, "Bahrain and Iran," 16 April 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans,
Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 367.
161

Foreign Office Minute by D.J. McCarthy, "Bahrain/Iran," 21 March 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans,
Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 348.
162

Despatch No. 4/1 from C.D. Wiggin, Tehran, to A.A. Acland, Foreign Office, "Bahrain and Iran/the ICJ," 6
March 1969 as found in Schofield and Evans, Arabian boundaries: new documents, 9: 337.

163 Alvandi,

"Muhammad Reza Pahlavi and the Bahrain Question."

49
the Shah had a high regard for public opinion and was conscious of gauging their perception.
This contrasts greatly to the Emir’s aim to limit the opportunities for it to be expressed.
Additionally, it has been shown that throughout the deliberations there was an overwhelming
concern for religious dynamics and how changes might instigate chaos in Bahrain. British
diplomats at all levels were also conscious of the dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Additionally, the negotiations reveal how the fate of the security network that would become
the United Arab Emirates could not be separated from the fate of an independent Bahrain.
Lastly, this deconstructed account illustrated how whilst constrained by public opinion the Shah
acted independently from his political advisors.
Bahrain declared independence in 1971, but this was not the only territorial change in
the Gulf. Due to an agreement with the ruler of what is now the Emirate of Sharjah Iran was
granted the northern half of the island of Abu Masa. At this time the Shah also requisitioned
the islands of Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs. On the eve of British retreat from the Persian
Gulf the Shah laid claim to new territory after denouncing ties to Bahrain, which leaves room
for speculation regarding what may have occurred behind closed doors between the British
Prime Minister’s announcement of future withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and physical
withdrawal in 1971. The following chapter aims to engage with the existent historical
evidence concerning a deal crafted between diplomatic authorities of Tehran and London
concerning the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs.
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“After all, it was not often that countries gave up claims, however unjustified,
and it was bound to occur to the Iranians sooner or later that they might get
something out of the renunciation of their claim to Bahrain if they carried it through.”164
– Geoffrey George Arthur
British Foreign Service Officer
1969

Chapter 3: Deal or No Deal

Introductory Remarks
The British Prime Minister’s January 1968 announcement of intent to withdraw all
British troops from Aden to Singapore signaled the disintegration of the informal British Empire.
Sir Geoffrey Arthur was the last appointed Political Resident in the Persian Gulf on behalf of the
United Kingdom and on December 19, 1971 following years of negotiations over the Shah’s
historically-rooted claim to Bahrain he illustrated for Foreign Secretary Lord Home the scene
before him of the HMS Achilles and HMS Intrepid departing from the port of Bahrain. “There
was no ceremony as the last British fighting unit withdrew from the Persian Gulf,” he wrote, “a
British merchant vessel in the opposite berth blew her siren, and Intrepid’s lone piper, scarcely
audible above the bustle of the port, played what sounded like some Gaelic lament. That was
all.”165 But that was not all. The last few days of formal British presence in the Persian Gulf in
the 1970s was not without additional territorial changes excluding Bahrain.
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Nineteen days prior, on November 30 1971 Iranian forces landed on both the Greater
Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands in addition to the northern part of Abu Masa.166 On the Tunbs
islands, the takeover was neither peaceful nor welcomed as rioting broke out. Inhabitants were
shipped on fishing boats off the island, and seven people were killed in the outbreak of
hostilities.167 There was still another sunrise till Britain’s protective treaty with the islands
expired, yet Britain did not respond to Iranian forces occupying the Tunbs. As explored earlier in
this historical analysis of the region, the Shah had publicly committed himself to relinquishing
the Iranian claim to Bahrain with British departure from the Gulf. The fact remains that on the
eve of British retreat from the region Iran laid claim to new territory after denouncing formal ties
to Bahrain. Was Iran’s occupation of the Tunbs islands therefore part of a pre-established
agreement? This chapter argues that despite discussions of a deal in the early stages of the
negotiations, there is not enough evidence to suggest the Iranian troops occupation in late 1971
was the result of such a quid pro quo agreement.168

The Islands: A Geographical and Historical Evaluation
The islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs are located in the main sea
lane for entering and exiting the Persian Gulf at the Sea of Hormuz. Greater Tunbs is located just
30 miles from the Iranian port of Lingeh, and 40 miles from what is now the Emirate of Ras alKhaimah.169 The geography of the island is perhaps best described by its name, which in the
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Persian dialect spoken in southern Iran closest to the coast translates to “hill.” A tiny territory, it
is estimated that in 1970 approximately 150 Arabs lived on the island of Greater Tunb. 170
Meanwhile, the completely uninhabitable Lesser Tunbs lies just eight miles southwest.171 A little
further off the coast of Lingeh one will find Abu Masa with its rich fertile soils. The three islands
share a strategic geographical location but when considering territorial changes in 1971 in the
Persian Gulf they cannot be evaluated equally.
The reason for this lies in the fact that there was a legal agreement allowing for the Shah
to annex the northern part of Abu Masa. In November 1971 the ruler of Sharjah, a trucial state,
and Mohammad Reza Shah signed an accord known as the Memorandum of Understanding,
which formally detailed jurisdiction for the island of Abu Masa. Prior to 1971, the United
Kingdom conducted diplomacy on behalf of the ruler of Sharjah for which it had a protective
treaty with reaching back to the 1880s.172 In anticipation of British withdrawal, the new
agreement created a fresh system of authority in which both the ruler of Sharjah and the Shah
would have joint, yet separate, administration over Abu Masa. Neither would recognize the claim
of sovereignty made by the other in which it was argued the island was respectively Arab or
Persian. Instead, based on agreed areas of occupation (Iran the northern half of the island, and
Sharjah the southern half of the island), each would have complete jurisdiction to bear their own
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flag, fish the island, and the right to a set division of energy resources.173 Indeed, when Iran’s
forces arrived to Abu Masa in late November the ruler of Sharjah’s brother welcomed the troops
himself.174
With the Memorandum of Understanding legitimizing partial Iranian authority on the
island and allowing for an influx of Iranian forces Abu Masa is therefore differentiated from the
Tunbs where there was no similar agreement made between the ruler of what is now the Emirate
of Ras al-Khaimah and the Shah. Yet, on the same day Iranian forces arrived on Abu Masa they
occupied the Tunbs islands; sending all inhabitants back to Ras al-Khaimah on small fishing
boats with outcry from the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah himself. 175 However, was this supplemental
seizure given the green light by London in exchange for the Shah abandoning the historicallyrooted claim to Bahrain the Foreign Office so desired?
I contend that there is not enough evidence to suggest that territorial changes in
November 1971 in the Persian Gulf were the product of a packaged agreement. However, this
does not make such an inquiry irrelevant. Rather, my findings contribute to the historiography of
the event, and discredit the argument that the Iranian officials believed they had secured the
islands was without a valid foundation. In conducting such an investigation I reviewed hundreds
of diplomatic telegrams, communiqués, memorandums, and briefings as exchanged by British
diplomatic personnel in the region at the time.176 Furthermore, I have examined Iranian memoirs,
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and the limited academic work done on the subject of Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs. Contrary
to the common scholarly opinion, I assert that at one point the British Foreign Office did suggest
a packaged settlement offer, but by 1971 this offer was not still part of the negotiating process
nor was it ever formalized.

Evidence of a Deal
Whilst researching the diplomacy that led to the relinquishment of the longstanding
Iranian claim to Bahrain I founded repeated references to a possible deal in both Iranian and
British sources. For example, early memorandums from the Foreign Office forecasted what was
to occur with formal British departure from the Persian Gulf and this should not be immediately
dismissed as coincidence. Sir Denis Wright, British Ambassador to Iran, commented in a
meeting in March 1968 that he believed the Shah “would go for the islands as soon as we left”177
and his prediction three years later became the status quo. Ambassador Wright’s foresight does
not imply a legal agreement of any kind, but his view is mirrored in Iranian sources which makes
one question what exactly was going on behind closed doors.
The Shah’s most trusted confidant, Asadollah Alam, recorded the day-to-day events of the
Iranian court in a diary that was published posthumously. In his journal I found clear indications
of a possible deal. Alam writes that the British Ambassador had hinted that if the Shah was to
back the creation of a federation of the Emirates Iran might be called upon to occupy islands in
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the Gulf.178 Similarly, he documented the Shah was “sure he’d bagged the islands” following his
declaration to allow the people of Bahrain to decide their own destiny in January 1969. 179
Whilst I contend the territorial changes in November 1971 were not the product of a
settlement deal between the Shah and British diplomats, this does not mean there was never a
possible deal. Rather, between spring of 1968 and autumn of 1969 negotiators in both Tehran and
London were giving serious consideration for a packaged agreement. Published archival material
retrospectively acknowledges a standing packaged deal in which Bahraini independence was
linked to Abu Masa and the Tunbs.180 In examining wires from the British Residency in Bahrain
to the Arabian Department of the Foreign Office in London there are repeated references to this
agreement. One high-level staffer wrote to another contemplating what might happen if
negotiators decided to revive the idea of a packaged deal.181 To “revive” the concept indicates
that at one point such a bargain was actively being considered. The prior existence of a deal is
supported by diplomatic briefs articulating a similar possibility of recreating a joint settlement in
the same fashion to that which had been conceived the year before.182 With statements such as
“when we put forward our package proposal last year” one cannot dispute that at one point a
quid pro quo exchange at the negotiating table.183 However, discussions of a deal before 1971 are
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not evidence of a settlement justifying the arrival of Iranian troops at the Tunbs in November
1971.
Rather, during the negotiations British diplomats concluded that it would be easier to
reach a solution regarding the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs once the
Iranian claim to Bahrain had been disposed of.184 By April 1969 the Foreign Office was actively
resisting any linking between Bahrain and the other islands, and representatives of the Foreign
Office were consistent in expressing to the Shah and Iranian negotiators that they could not
consider a package deal and the Shah should look to pursuing individual agreements with the
rulers of Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah independently.185 As succinctly noted by a British official
in correspondence: “it is not for us to tell one ruler that he should give up part of his territory to
benefit another.”186 The evidence suggests that the Foreign Office originally proposed a
packaged deal in 1968 that was never formally agreed upon. By the following year, British
diplomats were treating the issue of the islands and Bahrain separately. Archival material does
provide proof of a deal, but more than a year before Iran moved to station troops to the Tunbs
islands British officials were rejecting any sort of settlement.
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A Failure to Protect
If one accepts the evidence that the Foreign Office did not authorize the Iranian
occupation of islands in exchange for the Shah relinquishing the historically-rooted claim to
Bahrain then why did London not uphold its agreement to protect the islands? Beginning in early
1968 the British government explored both diplomatic and military means to solve the territorial
disputes over the islands in the Persian Gulf. Time and money went into crafting contingency
plans for the event of an Iranian seizure of the Tunbs. Known by the codename of PENSUM, if
Iran was to seize Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs British forces would occupy Abu Masa.
Additionally, there two other contingency plans known as PAMPERO and BUDLET/
ACCOLL.187 Despite such plans London pursued no such path to counter Iran’s actions.
Correspondence illustrates that the Foreign Office was aiming to “implement a policy of
deterrence through bluff” and despite the institution of contingency plans London was not
committed to using force. One Foreign Office official stated retrospectively in an interview that
British diplomats had done their best to help the Shah achieve negotiated settlements and even
going so far as to suggest the outright Iranian purchase of the Tunbs islands by the Shah. The
Foreign Office even explored the possibility of a three-way bargain in which the Sirri Island
would be awarded to Iran, Abu Musa awarded to the Sharjah, and the sale of the Tunbs of Iran. 188
Whilst diplomatic resolve was achieved with the ruler of Abu Masa no agreement was
reached regarding the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah concerning the Tunbs islands.Without forces
stationed the British government could not continue its treaty to protect the islands. 189 Some
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diplomatic personnel were vehemently in favor of military action, but in the midst of general
withdrawal from the region and a broader plan for British extraction from extraneous obligations,
the Foreign Office would not act to save two islands; one of which entirely uninhabitable.190
Such a failure to act is not an indication of a deal but rather the product of realist policies
pursued by the British diplomats. Furthermore, if the Iranian occupation was but a precoordinated exercise like that which culminated in the relinquishment of the historically rooted
claim it would be similarly documented. Arabian Boundaries: New Documents, 1966-1975 is
comprised of all British diplomatic correspondence concerning territorial changes in the Persian
Gulf region. Memorandums and briefings from early on in the negotiations explicitly refer to a
deal and the failure of the deal to actually manifest. If in fact a deal had been agreed upon for
November 1971 when Iran sent troops to the Tunbs islands, there would have been references to
the Foreign Office’s consent.

Historiography
In analyzing the evolution of the debate over a possible quid pro quo exchange of
territory between Iran and the United Kingdom over the Greater Tunbs, Lesser Tunbs, and
Bahrain, most scholarly analysis fails to acknowledge that one time this exchange was an
integral part of London’s negotiating strategy. Whilst I have concluded that no deal was
formalized, when it is portrayed in other works it is solely Iranian diplomatic personnel who are
trying to orchestrate a deal. This has no doubt slanted a comprehensive understanding of events
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and the possibility of British support for an exchange of territory has not been given due
credence.
Beyond ignoring the substantial consideration British officials gave to a packaged deal
regarding Bahrain and the islands, historiography also fails to acknowledge the regional belief
that a deal was crafted. Immediately following Iranian troops landing on the Tunbs islands
rumors began circulating that the British government had made an agreement with the ruler of
Ras Al-Khaimah in which the Shah could seize the Tunbs islands. 191 In Baghdad the seizure of
the islands was perceived as yet another British betrayal for the Foreign Office was still
responsible for their protection.192 Similarly in Libya, the second most prominent government
official193 articulated that “Britain bore responsibility for defending the islands. If Britain did not
react to the Iranian occupation, this would proof positive in Libyan eyes that it had taken place
with British connivance.”194 Deal or no deal, it was perceived as the former and with Sheikh
Saqr, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah looking to take the issue to both the Arab League and the
United Nations Security Council it was seemingly a debate that was not going away anytime
soon.195
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Concluding Remarks
The British government was formally obligated to protect the islands, yet it did not act in
November 1971. Prior to this date the Foreign Office had been active in pursuing a diplomatic
solution to the known dispute over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. With Abu Masa, diplomacy
had been successful when the rulers agreed to postpone a formal clause stating whether the
island was indeed Arab or Persian from the Memorandum of Understanding. 196 In regards to the
Greater and Lesser Tunbs, negotiations between the Ruler of Ras Al-Khaimah and the Shah did
not culminate in a similar treaty despite encouragement from the Foreign Office. Whilst not
reacting to Iranian’s seizure of the islands, there is no concrete evidence suggesting a deal.
Between 1968 and 1971 there were multiple discussions amongst British and Iranian negotiators
regarding a quid pro quo exchange of territory, which is often ignored. The existence of such
talks is not proof that these discussions were the premise for Iranian troops seizing the Tunbs
without approval in 1971. Since then the seizure of the Tunbs by Iranian forces continues to be
regarded by the United Arab Emirates as an “occupation.”197 The following chapter will examine
how the Iranian claims to Abu Masa and the Tunbs continue to impact its relations with its
neighbors, and how even Iran’s abandoned claim to Bahrain has had significant repercussions on
the domestic politics of Bahrain.
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“The principal demand of the Bahraini people today is to return this province,
which was separated from Iran, to its mother, Islamic Iran.” 198
– Hossein Shariatmadari
Editor-in-Chief of Kayhan
2007

Chapter 4: Enduring Relevance

Introductory Remarks
During the reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the Iranian state repeatedly expressed legal
jurisdiction over Bahrain.199 Negotiations beginning in 1968 formally abandoned the Iranian
claim to the island, but nearly 45 years after Iran’s approach to the United Nations SecretaryGeneral the Iranian connection remains relevant. This is evident when examining the current
Iranian political discourse concerned with annexing Bahrain. This inquiry then turns to
evaluating Bahrain’s domestic policies where through embracing the lens of monarchial
considerations one is a witness to the evolving strategies of the ruling family. In 1999 the Emir of
Bahrain200 was succeeded by his son, Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifah (r. 1999 - present)201 and their
treatment of domestic religious demographics is intricately tied in with the notion of an Iranian
claim to Bahrain.
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Just as the relationship between Tehran and Manama remains strained, the relationship
between the United Arab Emirates and Iran is uneasy as a result of Iran’s continued contention
that it has sovereignty over the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs. The
governments of Iran and the UAE have consistently asserted that each possesses rightful
sovereignty over the near-uninhabitable but strategically significant islands. The gravity of the
disagreement is found in the fact that the question of legal jurisdiction over the islands has made
it onto the agenda of not only regional but also international political summits. Iran continues to
contend that three islands in the Gulf are rightfully Iranian despite their function as a source of
extreme dispute with Iran’s neighbors. As a result, the islands have grown to take on an
importance beyond their geographically strategic value.

Annexing Bahrain
Despite formal relinquishment in 1971, the notion of Bahrain as an Iranian province has
remained prevalent in Iranian political discourse. The first time the claim arose following the
1968-1971 negotiations was in the midst of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. 202 In an aim to
export the revolution which had ousted the Shah, Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani203 called for the
Islamic Republic to annex Bahrain if the Emir of Bahrain did not adopt a similar model of
Islamic governance. 204 Whilst this was not a statement of the formal Foreign Ministry of the
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Islamic Republic, nor the opinion of Ayatollah Khomeini, the foremost leader of the Islamic
Revolution, the cry for such action reveals that a reassertion of Iran’s territorial claim was not out
of the question in 1979.
Possible annexation has been legitimized by more contemporary discourse in the Iranian
political sphere. In 2007 an editorial by the editor-in-chief of Kayhan, an Iranian daily, stirred
Iran-Bahrain relations. Hossein Shariatmadari wrote that:
Bahrain is part of Iran's soil, having been separated from it through an
illegal conspiracy [spawned] by... Shah [Pahlavi, in conjunction with] the
American and British governments. The principal demand of the Bahraini
people today is to return this province, which was separated from Iran, to
its mother, Islamic Iran.205
Shariatmadari also formally serves as a representative of Supreme Leader Ali Husseini
Khamenei, so his claims that Bahrain was an inseparable part of Iran triggered Bahraini anxiety
about future action of the Iranian government. Whilst the situation was tempered through
diplomatic back channels and espousing that Shariatmadari’s editorial was a personal view, and
not that of the government of Iran, tensions flared again in 2012.206 Kayhan printed another
editorial claiming that the Islamic Republic maintains the right to return Bahrain, a separated
province, to Iran. Furthermore, the editorial contended that Bahrainis consider themselves
Iranians, and that reports indicated they were eager to formally return to Iran.207
One might contend that such statements are simply rhetorical and do not reflect an actual
threat of annexation. However, the fact that this is a sentiment repeatedly expressed shows that

205

Mansharof and Rapoport, "Tensions in Iran-Bahrain Relations After Kayhan Editor Claims Bahrain Is
Inseparable Part of Iran."
206
207

Ibid.

Shahira Salloum, "Bahrain: A Hot Potato Across The Persian Gulf," Al Akhbar English, May 18, 2012. http://
english.al-akhbar.com/node/7427.

64
the historic claim to Bahrain is something to be tapped into, and something not entirely of the
past, but of the present.

Then and Now: Monarchial Strategies of the Al-Khalifah Family
The contemporary relevance of Iran’s historically-rooted claim to Bahrain is also
apparent when examining contemporary politics of the Persian Gulf. The historical negotiations
provide a window to the geopolitical considerations of the Emir of Bahrain and the Shah of Iran.
The depth of insight available reveals that since the negotiations there has been a dramatic
change in monarchial strategies in Bahrain. The policies pursued by the Emir in the earlier
negotiations vary considerably from his son, King Hamad, during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain.
Both sought to preserve the security of the monarchy, but aimed to achieve this in completely
contrasting manners.
During the deliberations over Iran’s claim to Bahrain, the former Emir continuously
objected to the Iranian suggestion of a plebiscite on the basis it would trigger the escalation of
domestic religious tensions.208 The outcome of the negotiations over the claim to Bahrain were
directly tied to the security of the monarchy,209 and the Sunni ruler knew the memories of the
1953-1954 Sunni-Shia riots remained vivid and sought to avoid a public referendum that may
have led to exacerbating religious tensions.210 The Emir viewed religious dissent as something
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that would prove harmful to both the Bahraini independence movement and the durability of his
regime.
In contrast his son King Hamad, who came to power in 1999, viewed the exacerbation of
religious tensions as key to maintaining the stability of his rule. This is most evident in the
policies pursued during the 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain for social, economic, and
governmental reform. That January, a wave a political upheaval swept across the Middle East as
a response to the self-immolation of Mohamad Bouazizi on the streets of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia.
Across the region demands for societal change were espoused and demonstrations broke out in
Oman, Yemen, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco. Whilst thousands were in Tahrir Square in Cairo
voicing their desire for the resignation of Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, social media
platforms were beginning to be utilized in Bahrain to call for similar protests with an aim of
transforming civil society.
The first days of demonstrations in Bahrain in February, 2011 were confined to remote
Shia communities, but the demonstrations as a whole were not limited to the Shia population. 211
In late February, members of the Shia majority were leading the majority of protests but the
desire for systemic change was widespread and increased as a response to the outbreak of police
brutality and numerous deaths at the hands of Bahraini security forces. A probe into the 2011
protests sponsored by King Hamad himself would later report both Sunni and Shia Bahrainis
were involved in the protests. 212 The report itself acknowledges the participation of Sunni actors,
and is proof of demonstrations not being limited to the Shia population of Bahrain. This is
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further evidenced when analyzing the protests themselves during which the people chanted that
they were not Sunnis or Shias, but only Bahrainis.213 There was a united desire for a greater
democratic process and economic opportunity domestically. However, it would be careless to
contend that all were in favor of such political changes, and many Sunnis at the outbreak of
demonstrations were dismissive of protestors. 214 Despite varying opinions, in late February 2011
it is estimated that one out of every six Bahraini citizens were protesting in Manama. 215
The domestic religious dynamic was utilized by King Hamad to solidify his position
domestically which was threatened by political demonstrations. In January Ben Ali, the President
of Tunisia, had been ousted; marking the first time widespread public protests had usurped an
Arab leader. 216 Similarly, in February, President Hosni Mubarak who had ruled Egypt for three
decades resigned — surrendering to the thousands of protestors who had demanded he abandon
his post.217 Those protesting in Tunisia and Egypt had not only demonstrated against high levels
of unemployment, lack of democratic processes, and limited opportunities but also for the
departure of their authoritarian rulers. When protests began in Bahrain, King Hamad was fearful
of the security of his regime, and he exploited the religious dynamic in order to maintain power.
The different status of Sunni and Shia Bahrainis is evident when analyzing Bahraini
society itself. The first Bahraini census was conducted in 1941 and revealed that the Shia
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population made up 53 per cent of the entire population.218 Since then, the Shia population has
grown exponentially and according to a 2010 census 75 per cent of the country’s population
subscribes to Shia Islam.219 There are entire cities in Bahrain such as Riffa, the second largest in
the Kingdom of Bahrain with a population of over 110,000, in which Shias are not allowed to
rent homes or purchase land. Any Sunnis with Iranian ancestry are also prohibited from living in
the area. 220 Furthermore, any Bahraini who falls into either of those two categories is not allowed
to hold a position in the police or armed forces. Employment is a serious issue for the Shia
population of Bahrain for the country’s largest employer is the Ministry of Interior and thus the
Shia population is limited in its socio-economic opportunities. 221 Political representation is
further restricted by procedural politics, and the country has been divided into imbalanced
sectarian constituencies. As one global report concluded: “in the southern governorate, which the
many newly naturalized persons reside, a block of around 2000 voters hold a seat in parliament,
whilst in the central and northern governorates, that are majority Shiite areas, block of around
7800 voters hold one.”222
Despite varied living experiences, the demonstrations that began in 2011 cannot be
explained by religion. It was strategic action by King Hamad which transformed the character of
turbulence in Bahrain into a sectarian issue. Protestors subscribing to both Sunni and Shia Islam
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were camped out in Pearl Square to demonstrate against the regime and in favor of democratic
reform.223 Al Wefaq, the largest political group 224 in Bahrain and also a Shia political group,
expressed during the protests that their actions were additionally fueled by the Shia population
“suffer[ing] systematic discrimination at the hands of the Sunni dynasty ruling Bahrain.”225
Overarching demands, however, mirrored those of protestors in Bahrain’s neighboring countries:
a desire for reform under monarchial rule. The demonstrations in early 2011 represent the
discriminatory, not sectarian, nature of Bahraini society.226 However, after February 2011 the
nature of discord was altered.
Following the outbreak of dissent, King Hamad aimed to break the unity of the original
movement through playing up religious tensions.227 Through drawing attention to and
perpetuating rhetoric of religious difference he managed to divert attention away from his regime
and on to the Shia population of Bahrain. As highlighted by Gregory Gause228 in a report for the
Brookings Doha Center, the original situation itself was not sectarian, but was transformed by
the regime into oppositional religious violence. 229 Through highlighting the historically
grounded claim to Bahrain and Iran’s alleged influence on the Bahraini Shia community, the
religious situation was exploited to maintain the security of the monarchy. Domestic turmoil was
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both externalized in the Iranian connection to Bahrain, and internalized in the domestic Shia
population.
In early March increasing numbers of people took to the streets. Whilst more radical Shia
political groups wanted the abdication of the monarchy, the largest political party in Bahrain230
wanted to establish a constitutional monarchy.231 In the first month of protests many had been
killed, and hundreds had been injured from acts of police brutality which included firing live
rounds on thousands of protestors who had been marching.232 With increasingly violent clashes
between security forces and demonstrators, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) announced that
it would, for the first time, authorize collective military action to suppress popular revolt.233 On
March 14 nearly 1,500 GCC troops entered Bahrain.
The alleged close link between the Bahraini people and the Iran allowed for King Hamad
to utilize sectarian divisions to sustain the ruling power structure.234 King Hamad justified
outside intervention with the argument that the Bahraini uprising was the result of foreign
(Iranian) intervention in Bahrain’s domestic politics.235 The Shia population of Bahrain has long
230
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been viewed by the Bahraini government as a “potential Iranian fifth column”236 ― an attitude
that has its origins in the discovery of coup plot backed by the Islamic Republic after the fall of
the Shah.237 This stated mission of the GCC forces was not only to support King Hamad’s
government against its domestic challengers but also, specifically, to deter Iran’s participation.238
In response to such outside intervention on the following day thousands of Bahrainis took to the
streets of Manama and protested in front of the Saudi embassy.239 The demonstrations turned
violent with over 200 people injured and two killed. 240 With the onset of increasing violence
King Hamad thus presented himself and the greater monarchy as not only a stabilizing force, but
as the protector of the Sunni community from the Shia majority.241 He enacted a State of
National Safety 242 and authorized excessive use of force to put down protests. King Hamad
justified his position both through citing a threat to national security and playing up social
divisions. As a result he was able to prevent a cross-sectarian opposition front and diffuse unified
demands for reform.243
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Original demonstrations acted as a catalyst for deflecting social problems away from the
monarchy and onto the Shia population of Bahrain; which has continued to this day. King Hamad
has contended since February 2011 that the political activities of the Shia community of Bahrain
is a threat to the national security of Bahrain and has employed a $32 million dollar public
relations campaign to persuade the public of this.244 Yet, there was no credible evidence in 2011
that Iran played a part in Bahrain’s uprising.245 The autumn after protests first broke out King
Hamad established an independent commission to look into the origins of the uprising and
examine how reconciliation might occur. The investigation was chaired by Mahmoud Cherif
Bassiouni246 and despite the links between the Commission of Inquiry and King Hamad no proof
of an Iranian connection was found in the formal report.247
At the time of this analysis in 2015 there have not been any new empirical links made
between Iran and the Shia community in Bahrain. 248 It was this original claim of Iranian
interference in Bahraini domestic politics that triggered allowed for King Hamad to legitimize
violence against Bahraini citizens, centralize his rule, and target the Shia population. To this day
King Hamad continues to exploit the link between the Shia population of Bahrain and Iran. Since
2011 further governmental crackdown has continued to disenfranchise the Shia population.249
244

Glenn Greenwald, "Why didn’t CNN’s international arm air own documentary on Bahrain’s Arab Spring
repression?" The Guardian, September 4, 2012. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/04/cnn-internationaldocumentary-bahrain-arab-spring-repression
245

Ulrichsen, After the Arab Spring, 30.

246

Mahmoud Cherif Baassiouni is an Egyptian known world-wide for his work relating to international criminal law
and war crimes. He led the UN Security Council efforts to examine war crimes in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s
and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999.
247Ulrichsen,
248
249

After the Arab Spring, 30.

Michael Slackman, "The Proxy Battle in Bahrain," New York Times, March 20, 2011.

Souad Makhennet, "Bahrain’s Shiite-Sunni Animosities Linger on a Campus a Year After Clashes," New York
Times, March 28, 2012.

72
Currently, a prominent Shia cleric awaits trial for illegally instigating political change.250 The
largest political group in Bahrain, a Shia political party, has been banned by the Bahraini
government.251 Furthermore, the Interior Ministry continues to revoke the citizenship of many
Shias with the aim of “protect[ing] the security and stability of Bahrain.”252

Unresolved Controversy
The continued relevance of Iran’s historical claims to territory in the Persian Gulf is
apparent when looking beyond Bahrain to the islands of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser
Tunbs. Whilst Iran did not have formal agreement allowing it to seize the islands of Greater and
Lesser Tunbs in November 1971 the Shah had procured an agreement, known as the
Memorandum of Understanding, with the Ruler of Sharjah to legally seize the northern half of
the island of Abu Masa — the details of which are detailed in the prior chapter of this analysis.
Yet, since 1971 when the settlement was ratified, the government of the United Arab Emirates
protests that Iran has breached the terms of the agreement and that the Iranian government
occupies parts of the island not allocated to it in the 1971 Memorandum of Understanding.253
The animosity of the government of the United Arab Emirates towards Iran concerning
the island of Abu Masa is not entirely unwarranted. Following the signing of bi-lateral
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agreements between Gulf states and outside powers in the early 1990s the Iranian government
was increasingly concerned that the UAE might send foreign nationals to the island of Abu Masa
—which it had increasingly been doing with Egyptians.254 It was soon affirmed by Iranian
diplomats that all governmental representatives of the UAE had been expelled from Abu
Masa.255 Those with citizenship from the UAE living on Abu Masa were forced to obtain Iranian
documents to leave the island, and by August 1992 non-UAE citizens were being both expelled
from the island and denied entry.256 As highlighted by one scholar of the dispute, once both
educators and families were allowed to return to the island that November a state of normalcy
resumed. However, “normal” in this context means lingering dispute over island sovereignty and
persistence of aggressive rhetoric between the two states.
Controversy has prevailed, and both Iran and the United Arab Emirates continue to
quarrel over the current status of sovereignty of the tiny island. The visit of Iranian President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Abu Masa in April 2012 solicited multiple statements from both
Abdullah bin Zayed, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the UAE, and officials from other Gulf states
who condemned his “flagrant violation” of the UAE’s jurisdiction over the island.257 This stance
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remains unchanged, and just six months ago bin Zayed expressed his anger over the hoisting of
the Iranian flag over the part of Abu Masa adjudicated to the UAE.258
Past attempts to garner a diplomatic solution between the two parties over the current
state of sovereignty have failed. For both Iran and the UAE, the sovereignty of Abu Masa is a
vexing issue despite the Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in 1971. There was
no similar agreement reached regarding the Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands, and thus
from the moment troops arrived at the island Iran’s presence remains both controversial and
contested. With declarations of animosity from the past few months there can be no disagreement
that the islands remain central to current tensions between both Iran and the UAE.

The Islands: A Source of Iranian Nationalism
The Iranian government continues to contend that the islands of Abu Masa, Greater
Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs fall under the legal jurisdiction of the Iranian state. Beyond
geographical value, the islands are an active source for nationalist rhetoric. During the
presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad between 2005 and 2013 Iran’s nuclear program similarly
served as a source of pride. During this time a columnist for Time Magazine in Tehran
commented in an interview that:
a year ago [in 2005], there was no strong or collective opinion among
young people on the nuclear issue. Today, it's a completely different
atmosphere. Most young people, you know--secular, middle-class,
traditional or otherwise--have been really convinced by the nationalist
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rhetoric of the president, that this is a national right and, sort of see this as
the cornerstone for Iran being strong in the region, and in the world. 259
Iran became increasingly isolated both diplomatically and economically and it is within this
context the nuclear program took on a sense of national significance. This is further evidenced by
the issue of a new rial260 note with the image of electrons and an atom, and frequent national
announcements regarding advancements in uranium enrichment.261
In 2006 the United Nations adopted Resolution 1969 to impose sanctions with the aim of
deterring the development of Iran’s nuclear program. These sanctions, in addition to further
sanctions enforced by the United States 262 and the European Union, have had damaging
ramifications beyond the energy sector and made it extremely difficult for Iran to conduct trade
and commerce.263 As a result, multiple industries throughout Iran have collapsed 264 and there
remains little job security, few opportunities, and high unemployment.265 In 2012, it was reported
that the automobile industry alone had directly or indirectly accounted for the layoffs of 2 million
workers. Throughout the country families are suffering which is affirmed by further statistics: a
survey conducted by the Central Bank of Iran concluded that in 2012, 22.5 per cent of Iranian
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families had universal unemployment ― meaning all members of the family were unemployed.
General standards of living have decreased as the government has been unable to profit off of its
oil exports during sanctions, falling behind Iraqi production for the first time since the beginning
of the Iran-Iraq war. 266 It is with this backdrop that the territorial disputes over Abu Masa and
the Tunbs become both a distraction from internal domestic problems, and a source for national
pride.
Through maintaining its claim to the islands in the Persian Gulf the Iranian government is
affirming its position in the region. Some members of Iranian legislature have suggested that Iran
formally declare Abu Masa and Iranian province, and other Iranian officials have suggested that
the street where the embassy of the United Arab Emirates is located in Tehran be renamed Abu
Masa.267 In similar fashion to the function of the Iranian nuclear program under Ahmadinejad,
Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser Tunbs have been brought to the forefront of national
discourse and exploited as a source for national sentiment.268 The dispute over the islands
between Iran and the United Arab Emirates remains as controversial as ever with the situation
today mirroring that which it was in 1971 where neither of the parties involved accepted each
others claim to sovereignty and each maintained its own claim as righteous. What has changed
however, is role of the islands in terms of Iranian identity.
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The Arab Islands
The controversial argument over the sovereignty of the three islands is not limited to
discussions between Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Abdullah bin Zayed, the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the UAE, remains vigilant in articulating his country’s disapproval of the
Iranian occupation of all three islands on the international stage.269 He has repeatedly reiterated
the desire of the UAE for the international community to resolve the dispute under the provision
of international law, or through taking the case to the International Court of Justice.270 The
renowned Iranian historian Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh has argued that in recent years the United
Arab Emirates has aimed to both politicize and internationalize the island disputes in the Persian
Gulf:
Like the way the Arabs began to refer to the Palestinian lands occupied by
Israel as the “Occupied Arabic lands” in order to make the issue a cause
celebre at the Arab World level, Abu Dhabi too has been referring to the
islands of the Tunbs and Abu Musa as the “Occupied Arab Lands” in order
to turn the issue of its claims on these islands into a cause celebre at the
Middle East level as a symbol of Arab national resistance to the Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf. 271
This is seemingly not a new phenomena, for the islands have repeatedly been drawn into the
discourse of other conflicts. Such is the case when examining the war which broke out in 1980
between the newly-established Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. Increasing border clashes and
dispute over the Shatt al-Arab waterway led to the termination of their joint border agreement
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and Iraqi President Saddam Hussein moved to station one third of Iraq’s forces on the Iranian
border before invading the Islamic Republic in late September. 272 One of the stipulations put
forth by Iraqi President Saddam Hussein before Iraqi forces would withdraw from Iran was the
“return to Arab sovereignty” of Abu Muasa, and the Tunbs.273 He did not mean for the islands to
now by ruled by Ba’athist Iraq, but for a return of full authority of the islands to the United Arab
Emirates. Hussein’s request was a supplemental clause to greater demands but the fact the
islands were included show how the dispute has been intertwined with broader politics in the
Persian Gulf. Iran’s presence on Abu Masa and the Tunbs for other states in the region has
therefore taken on symbolism for Iran’s perceived to be expansionist aims — what one scholar
once called Pax Iranica.274
Such internationalization of the islands dispute is apparent when examining the
diplomacy of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The importance of the islands beyond the United
Arab Emirates is evidenced by the fact that during the 2006 GCC summit the issue of island
sovereignty was written into the agenda for the meeting of Arab Gulf leaders. Furthermore, the
press release of the summit detailed that all in attendance supported “the right of the State of the
UAE to regain sovereignty over her three islands, which are the Greater and the Lesser Tunbs
and Abu Musa, and over the territorial waters, the airspace, the continental shelf, and the
economic zone of the three islands, as they are an integral part of the State of the United Arab

272 Associated

Press, "Iraq Ends 1975 Border Pact with Iran as Frontier Clashes Continue," New York Times,
September 18, 1980.
273
274

Pranay Gupte, "Iraq Warns of Hostilities Till 'Rights' are Granted," New York Times, November 5, 1980.

In 1974 a lecturer in Contemporary History of the Near and Middle East at the School of Oriental and African
Studies at the University of London wrote that “From the point of view of some of the smaller States of the Gulf
who could not look after their own defense, the Pax Iranica might not be so very different from the Pax Britannica.”
See R.M. Burrell, "Iranian Foreign Policy During the Last Decade," Asian Affairs 5, no. 1 (1974): 12.

79
Emirates.”275 The controversy has also taken on a more international component, for the subject
of the islands was featured in the statement of the GCC-EU Joint Council meeting in 2007. Thus,
even beyond the Persian Gulf itself the territorial disputes remain intrinsic to Gulf affairs.276

Concluding Remarks
This chapter began by evaluating the role of the historically rooted Iranian link to Bahrain
in contemporary political discourse. Iranian officials continue to threaten to annex Bahrain and
this rhetoric reaffirms that the Iran-Bahrain bond is not one of the past, but relevant to the
present. The importance of the claim abandoned nearly 45 years ago is visible when examining
the strategy employed by King Hamad of Bahrain, which I argue is intricately intertwined with
the formally disposed Iranian claim. The alleged connection between Iran, the regional bastion of
Shia Islam, and the Shia population of Bahrain continues to serve as justification for excessive
use of governmental force and institutionalized discrimination. The seizure of the Tunbs islands
remains equally as relevant to contemporary affairs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s occupation of the
islands continues to dictate the temperature of the relationship between Iran and the United Arab
Emirates, and have come to serve a new function as a source of nationalist pride.
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“No people can live in the past — not even its own past. But if
it no longer has a link with its history, it must of necessity perish.”277
– Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
Shah of Iran
1980

Conclusion
From January 1968 to March 1970 representatives from Iran, Bahrain, and the United
Kingdom negotiated to reach a settlement relinquishing formal Iranian ties to Bahrain. Through
utilizing the auspices of the United Nations the Iranian claim was disposed of, but additional
territorial changes soon ensued in the Persian Gulf. In November 1971 Iranian forces landed on
the northern half of Abu Masa, and both the Greater Tunbs and Lesser Tunbs islands. Whilst the
Shah had garnered an agreement known as the Memorandum of Understanding to inhabit part of
Abu Masa, no such resolve was reached in regards to the Tunbs. The status of Iran’s involvement
regarding the three islands, and especially the Tunbs, remains subject to both controversy and
contempt. Through contextualizing instances of diplomacy, I have sought to explore what it
means for territory to be abandoned. In formulating a case in which Iran both abandoned and
seized territory, a commentary on statecraft and sovereignty emerges which is able to lend itself
towards further research of the Persian Gulf both past and present.
The first chapter of this analysis began by framing the relationship between Iran and the
United Kingdom at the turn of the twentieth century. To illustrate common opposition to foreign
activities in Iran I highlighted specific episodes of economic exploitation. This sentiment was
exacerbated by the role of the American government in overthrowing the democratically elected
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Prime Minister. Oral history projects and memoirs detailed how foreign governments support for
the development of the Shah’s militarized police network, SAVAK, further amplified existing
attitudes. With the British Prime Minister’s declaration to withdraw forces from the Persian Gulf
the Shah sought to abandon the claim that was causing tension between him and his neighbors:
the Iranian claim of sovereignty over Bahrain. To determine how the disposal of the claim was
achieved hundreds of pages of diplomatic correspondence was read. In reconstructing the twenty
six months of shuttle diplomacy the different phases of the negotiations, beginning with the Shah
demanding a plebiscite and ending with an approach to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, were highlighted. Furthermore, the chronology put forth by other scholars was proven
faulty and reworked to be true to the negotiations themselves.
The second chapter utilized a thematic approach to engage with the intricacies of the
negotiations. I contend that throughout the duration of the deliberations both the Shah of Iran and
the Emir of Bahrain were vehemently concerned with domestic politics. However, such
obsession for public opinion was for completely opposing reasons. Whilst the Shah was
engaging with domestic attitude towards Bahrain and the United Kingdom, the Emir of Bahrain
sought to limit all possible expression of opinion, believing that the introduction of new
legislative mechanisms into civil society might instigate both political and religious chaos. After
evaluating attitudes towards religion, I maintain the abandonment of the Bahrain claim can not
be separated from creation of a formal union of the smaller Gulf states now known as the United
Arab Emirates. Lastly, I contend that throughout the negotiations the Shah was constrained by
his concern for public opinion, but ultimately acted independently from his political advisers.
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Following the disposal of the formal Iranian claim to Bahrain, chapter three explores how
Iranian troops occupied three other islands in the Persian Gulf: Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and
Lesser Tunbs. Historiography of the event has entirely ignored that at one point a quid pro quo
was an integral part of Britain’s negotiating strategy. Such an argument is further evidenced by
retrospective references to a negotiated packaged settlement. However, it has been proven that
British diplomatic officials rejected links between Bahrain and the other islands and were
continuously advocating for negotiated with settlements with individual rulers of the islands.
Therefore, there is simply not enough evidence to conclude that territorial changes in November
1971 came as the result of a deal crafted between British and Iranian officials.
Whilst the Shah sought to abandon the Iranian states claim to formal claim to Bahrain it
is not a thing of the past. Chapter four of this analysis began by evaluating the role of the
historically rooted Iranian link to Bahrain in contemporary political discourse. Some in the
Iranian political sphere continue to call for annexation to reunite the alleged province with Iran
which reaffirms that the Iran-Bahrain bond is not one of the past, but relevant to the present. The
importance of the formal claim abandoned nearly 45 years ago is visible when examining the
strategies employed by King Hamad of Bahrain. The alleged connection between Iran, the
regional bastion of Shia Islam, and the Shia population of Bahrain continues to serve as
justification for excessive use of governmental force and institutionalized discrimination.
Similarly, the Abu Masa and the Tunbs remain a source of debate for the governments of Iran
and the United Arab Emirates. Their contested sovereignty has been disputed on the international
stage, and representatives of the UAE continue to call for the matter to be resolved through the
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United Nations. Iran’s increased diplomatic and economic isolation in the recent years has also
brought foreword the islands in terms of national consciousness.
The case of the abandonment of the formal Iranian claim to Bahrain and subsequent
seizure of islands in the Persian Gulf provides insight to how diplomatic results were garnered.
Close evaluation reveals that there was no predetermined path from point A to point B.
Generated outcomes were due to confronting challenges with persistence and compromise. The
Shah’s commitment to abandoning the historically-rooted claim to Bahrain was not enough, but
required considerable thought over methodology and specifics. As illustrated in this analysis
there were multiple instances when negotiations could have come to a halt, or dramatically
changed course. For instance, beginning in 1969 the Foreign Office attempted to broker
individual deals between the Shah and the rulers of the Abu Masa and Tunbs islands which the
Shah had made clear he desired. One notion put forth encompassed a three way trade in which
the Sirri island would be awarded to Iran, Abu Masa to the Sharjah, and the Tunbs would be sold
to Iran.278 Had such proposals been ratified the landscape of sovereignty in the Persian Gulf
would vary from what presently exists.
An in-depth approach to these negotiations reveals the true nature of diplomacy in which
statecraft was conducted, primarily, by rulers. The Shah of Iran and the Emir of Bahrain were
most active in the discussions that brought about a joint approach to the United Nations. Whilst
other high-level officials took meetings with representatives of the United Kingdom, the majority
of the deliberations included the two monarchs themselves and not their foreign ministers or
other spokesmen of the state. The Shah and Emir respectively navigated the challenges of
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political decision making on their own. This point is further evidenced by the fact that more than
one year into the deliberations regarding Bahrain the Iranian Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, the party whom the Shah was negotiating with, did not know that the Shah had
committed to dispose of the Iranian claim.
In examining what happens when territory is formally abandoned the cost of altering the
state of territorial sovereignty becomes rapidly apparent. There were many ramifications to the
disposal of the Iranian claim which have set the temperament for Iran’s relationship with its
neighbors. At the time the negotiations were heralded by those involved as an instance of
successful international diplomacy, but to date the connection between Iran and Bahrain,
although formally relinquished, has caused immense tension for the two governments. Similarly,
the subsequent move of Iranian forces to the coasts of Abu Masa, Greater Tunbs, and Lesser
Tunbs in the autumn of 1971 continues to strain the relationship between Iran and the United
Arab Emirates. A close reading of the history of the Persian Gulf illustrates how the past cannot
be separated from the present, and is key to understanding the political climate of the region.
The disposal of a territorial claim is not a phenomena unique to Iran, nor the Persian
Gulf, nor the Middle East. When embraced in abstracts the research narrated in this thesis is of
one state abandoning its ties to another territory in a broader period that saw the restructuring of
maps, polities, and loyalties. The dramatic transformation of regional dynamics could be used to
describe other recent historical events such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, and many of the
territorial disputes that grace the headlines of newspapers each day. Historical conditions of the
past will never completely mirror those of the present, but the insight drawn from this instance of
diplomacy lends itself towards further comprehension of changing global dynamics.
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